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Abstract
This dissertation oﬀers three independent studies that each contributes to the literature
on trade facilitation. The papers are built on the gravity model framework where the rela-
tionship between trade facilitation variables and the volume of agricultural exports across the
border are examined. To deal with the issue of endogeneity, instrumental variable regression
is used. The study also corrects for sample-selection bias present in the trade data. The
ﬁrst paper examines the role of e-governance on bilateral agricultural trade. The study ﬁnds
that better quality of e-governance promotes agricultural exports. Speciﬁcally, according
to the ﬁndings of the paper, the quality of e-governance in the exporting country increases
the volume of agricultural exports across the border. However, the quality of e-governance
prevailing in the importing country does not inﬂuence agricultural exports signiﬁcantly. The
second paper deals with the eﬀect of corruption on bilateral agricultural trade. Using diﬀerent
measures of corruption this paper examines the role of institutional quality on agricultural
exports. The study ﬁnds both trade-enhancing and trade-taxing role of corruption on agri-
cultural exports. Furthermore, according to the ﬁndings of the study, the eﬀects are much
more prominent for the degree of corruption in the exporting country than the importing
country. The third paper studies the impact of Internet adoption on bilateral trade. This
paper distinguishes between agricultural and non-agricultural commodities. According to
the ﬁndings of the paper, Internet penetration encourages non-agricultural exports but it
does not have any signiﬁcant impact on agricultural trade.
v
Chapter 1. Introduction
International trade plays an important role in the economic well-being of a nation. With
the continuing growth in international trade and falling tariﬀ barriers in the recent years,
increased concern is placed on non-tariﬀ barriers aﬀecting the volume of cross-border trade.
Trade across borders faces obstacles in the form of capacity constraints given limited facil-
ities, ineﬃcient port operations, burdensome customs procedures, excessive documentation
requirements, low quality of human capital, and corruption at the borders, etc. All these fac-
tors serve to increase costs and delays in international trade (Djankov et al., 2006) which in
turn inﬂuences the volume of trade across the borders. To solve this problem, governments
and businesses use various measures to modernize and simplify transaction procedures at
national borders. Therefore, trade facilitation reform to reduce transaction costs associated
with international trade has signiﬁcant relevance in terms of policies. Trade facilitation can
be deﬁned as a tool to reduce the complexities of international trade in a cost-eﬀective way
while ensuring transparent and eﬃcient trade deals. Some researchers deﬁne trade facilita-
tion as the tool that helps reduce the volume and impact of red tape, a term traditionally
associated with wasteful and time-consuming bureaucracy found in international trade op-
erations (Grainger, 2011). Trade facilitation also involves reducing the transaction costs
associated with the enforcement, regulation and administration of trade policies (Staples,
2002). The World Trade Organization (WTO)1 deﬁnes trade facilitation as: The simpliﬁ-
cation and harmonization of international trade procedures where trade procedures are the
activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, presenting, communicating and
processing data required for the movement of goods in international trade.
The objective of this dissertation is, to study the impact of variables that can inﬂuence
the transit time between origin and destination. Here an attempt has been made to quantify
the probable eﬀect of variables such as e-governance, the Internet, and corruption that can
1Visit: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm
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play a major role in facilitating or hindering international trade across borders. The study
is conducted on trade in agricultural commodities. The perishable nature of agricultural
commodities makes them more vulnerable to delays in trade (Liu and Yue, 2013). Longer
waits in customs can severely degrade product quality and reduce product price. Longer
waits at the customs also adversely aﬀect exporters by increasing inventory holding costs.
Thus, examining variables that can signiﬁcantly aﬀect trading time along with aﬀecting
transaction costs has important policy implications. Very little research has been done to
estimate the impact of these variables on agricultural trade. Therefore, it is important to
study the impact of these trade facilitation variables on the agricultural trade performance
of a country.
1.1 Trade Facilitation Literature
While the existing literature studying the eﬀect of trade facilitation on agricultural commodi-
ties are negligible, this study follows a rich existing literature on the relationship between
trade facilitation and the volume of bilateral trade related to non-agricultural products. In
their seminal paper Wilson et al., (2003), deviate from the traditional computable general
equilibrium (CGE) approach to measure the impact of trade facilitation on trade perfor-
mance and instead employ a gravity model to examine the relationship. They consider four
measures of trade facilitation: port infrastructure, customs environment, regulatory environ-
ment, and e-business infrastructures and examine their eﬀect on trade for APEC countries.
They do this for a single year by applying single averages to 13 primary variables. Wilson et
al., (2005), extend this model to 75 countries. They examine the eﬀect of trade facilitation
on the volume of trade in manufacturing goods for the years 2000-2001 and further investi-
gate the stability of the estimated relationships across South-to-South and North-to-South
trade. In both papers, they found increased trade in commodities from improvements in all
four trade facilitation variables.
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Wilson and Perez (2010) contribute to the trade facilitation literature by constructing four
new aggregate indicators related to trade facilitation from a wide range of primary indicators
using factor analysis. These indicators are i) Physical infrastructure; ii) Information and
communications technology (ICT); iii) Border and transport eﬃciency; and iv) Business and
regulatory environment. They also employ an augmented gravity model to assess the impact
of diﬀerent aspects related to trade facilitation, as measured by these four indicators, on
export performance. Their results also support the previous ﬁndings that improvement in
trade facilitation variables increases the volume of trade.
Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2007) also use a gravity model to examine the eﬀect of reg-
ulatory quality and trade facilitation on export performance. They use the gravity model
to provide a quantitative assessment of the potential contribution of trade facilitation in
improving export performance by reducing export costs. Their results suggest that trade fa-
cilitation reform, border reform, improved regulatory environment, and enhanced transport
& communications infrastructure all facilitate export growth.
Djankov et al., (2006) ﬁnd that, on average, each additional day that a product is delayed
prior to being shipped reduces trade by at least 1%. They found a larger eﬀect on time-
sensitive agricultural products. According to their ﬁndings, a day's delay reduces a country's
relative exports of products by 6%. Liu and Yue (2013) investigate how time delays aﬀect
product quality, product price, trade ﬂow, and social welfare. They use data on the number
of days it takes for customs clearance in diﬀerent countries for agricultural commodities with
diﬀerent levels of perishability. Their results suggest that longer time delays at the border
signiﬁcantly decrease perishable agricultural products' quality and price. They further ﬁnd
that for highly perishable agricultural products, improved and simpliﬁed customs procedures
increase trade ﬂows and the social welfare of importing countries.
Using the World Bank's Doing Business database, Zaki (2015) determines the predicted
time related to trade facilitation in developed and developing countries. In his paper, a grav-
ity model is used to estimate ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of the administrative barriers to
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trade. The paper ﬁnds that the internet, bureaucracy, corruption, and geographic variables
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the transaction time to import and to export. Also, the time to
import has a higher negative impact on trade than that to export.
Using bilateral trade panel data, Francois et al., (2013), explore the inﬂuence of the in-
frastructure and institutional quality on patterns of trade. In a gravity model setup using
a Poisson estimator, they extended the Baier and Bergstrand method for multilateral resis-
tance, accounting for ﬁrm heterogeneity and ﬁrm selection. Their result suggests that export
performance and the propensity to take part in the trading system depends on the institu-
tional quality and access to well-developed transport and communications infrastructure of
both the countries involved in the trade.
This paper also builds on the same gravity model framework where the relationship
between trade facilitation variables and the volume of agricultural trade across the border
is examined. Formally the paper tries to answer the following questions empirically.
Q1. What is the eﬀect of e-governance on bilateral agricultural trade?
Q2. What is the eﬀect of corruption on bilateral agricultural trade?
Q3. What is the eﬀect of the Internet on bilateral agricultural trade?
1.2 Overview
The motivation of this dissertation is to examine the factors that can inﬂuence the transit
time between origin and destination and can play a major role in facilitating or hindering
international trade across borders. In this study, an augmented gravity model is used, and
diﬀerent estimation techniques are incorporated to empirically investigate the impact of trade
facilitation on bilateral agricultural trade. The dissertation deals with the issue of causality
by identifying appropriate instruments and also solves for the sample-selection bias. This
work is accomplished and presented through a journal-article style dissertation divided into
three sections. The second chapter of the dissertation is entitled The Role of E-governance
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on Bilateral Agricultural Trade. This is the ﬁrst cross-country study in the trade literature
that examines the eﬀect of e-governance measures on agricultural exports. The paper also
proposes a novel instrument to deal with the issue of endogeneity. The results suggest that
the quality of e-governance has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the volume of agricultural
exports.
The third chapter entitled The Role of Corruption on Bilateral Agricultural Trade stud-
ies the role of corruption on bilateral agricultural trade. This is the ﬁrst cross-country study
that establishes a relationship between agricultural commodities and the level of corruption
prevailing in a country. According to the ﬁndings of this study, corruption can be trade-
taxing when the protection level is low, but with the degree of protection higher than a
threshold level, it becomes trade-enhancing.
The fourth chapter entitled The Role of the Internet on Bilateral Agricultural Trade
is a cross-country study analyzing the impact of internet penetration on bilateral exports.
Separate analyses were conducted on trade related to agricultural and non- agricultural
commodities. The paper proposes a novel instrument to deal with the issue of endogeneity.
According to the ﬁndings of the study, the Internet adoption has a signiﬁcant and positive
impact on non-agricultural exports. The study found weak evidence of a trade-stimulating
eﬀect of the Internet on agricultural exports.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Chapter 5. The ﬁndings from the previous three chap-
ters are highlighted and future directions for research are discussed.
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Chapter 2. The Role of E-governance on
Bilateral Agricultural Trade
2.1 Introduction
The sonorous message at the United Nations Economic Commission Global Trade facilitation
conference was Governments should embrace the digital revolution of international trade.
Simplifying lengthy paper processes and cutting red tape by going digital means sustainable,
faster, and more eﬃcient trade. (Van Der Valk, 2014)1. Echoing the same message, many
countries have introduced or improved electronic data interchange systems to make trade
easier. This system allows traders to ﬁle, transfer and process customs information online.
It also allows them to submit their documents and pay duties online from anywhere in
the world. Therefore, this system improves transactional eﬃciency and also saves time by
reducing the number of visits to government oﬃces and by reducing the waiting time (Unwin,
2009). At the same time, this system reduces the probability of direct interaction between
the traders and the customs oﬃcials, thereby reducing the incidence of bribery. According
to a World Bank survey, to accelerate service delivery in India, fewer users were required to
pay bribes to government oﬃcials under e-government projects than under manual projects
(Unwin, 2009). Therefore, many developing and developed countries, ﬁnd it worth investing
in Information and Communication Technology (henceforth ICT) to improve the quality
and eﬃciency of government services. For example, in China, total e-governance spending
increased from $7 billion in 2006 to more than $10 billion in 2008 (Unwin, 2009).
One such variable that captures how each country has advanced in introducing or adopt-
ing the new technology over time is the e-government index constructed by United Nations.
As mentioned in the E-government Survey Report (2003), the success of e-governance de-
1Visit: http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/03/11/globe-trade-going-paperless
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pends upon three pre-requisites: a minimum threshold level of technological infrastructure,
human capital, and e-connectivity for all the citizens. To construct the E-government Index,
the study, therefore, focused on how each country relies upon information technology to pro-
vide service to its citizen. The index also measures the quality of a country's human capital.
The E-government Index constructed by the United Nations has two primary indicators: i)
The state of E-government Readiness; and ii) The extent of E-participation.
According to the United Nations E-government Survey Report (2003), the E-government
Readiness Index is deﬁned as follows: The generic capacity or aptitude of the public sector
to use Information and Communication Technology for encapsulating in public services and
deploying to the public, high-quality information (explicit knowledge) and eﬀective commu-
nication tools that support human development. The E-government Readiness Index is a
composite index comprised of the following indices: a) The Web Measure Index; b) The
Telecommunication Infrastructure Index; and c) The Human Capital Index.
The Web Measure Index captures the web presence of government in providing services
to its citizens. It captures whether a public oﬃce has any oﬃcial website, a national portal
or an oﬃcial home page and if the necessary information is available online. It measures if
these websites allow users to complete entire tasks electronically at any time or to submit
forms online. It takes into account whether these websites are equipped to allow citizens to
pay taxes or to apply for ID cards, birth certiﬁcates/passports, licenses, etc.
The Telecommunication Infrastructure Index is a weighted average index of the following
primary indices: a) Personal Computers/1,000 persons; b) Internet users/1,000 persons; c)
Telephone Lines/1,000 Persons; d) On-line population/1,000 persons; e) Mobile phones/1,000
persons; and f) Televisions/1,000 persons.
The Human Capital Index is a composite measure of the adult literacy rate and the
combined gross enrollment ratio, with two-third weight given to adult literacy and one-third
to the gross enrollment ratio.
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The same report deﬁnes the extent of E-participation as follows: The willingness, on the
part of the government, to use ICT to provide high quality information (explicit knowledge)
and eﬀective communication tools for the speciﬁc purpose of empowering people for able
participation in consultations and decision-making, both in their capacity as consumers of
public services and as citizens. (UN Global E-government Survey, 2003)
Table 2.1 lists the ﬁve countries with highest quality of e-governance and ﬁve coun-
tries with the lowest quality of e-governance in descending order of as measured by the
E-governance Readiness Index.
Table 2.1: Quality of E-governance in the World, 2005
Country Trade Total E-government
Rank Country Code Value GDP Readiness
(million US $) (billion US $) Index
Countries with highest quality of e-governance
1. United States USA 48239.52 13095 0.91
2. Denmark DNK 13196.35 246.60 0.91
3. Sweden SWE 3569.51 389.00 0.90
4. United Kingdom GBR 12031.97 2412.0 0.88
5. South Korea KOR 2467.29 898.10 0.87
Countries with lowest quality of e-governance
5. Palau PLW - 0.2062 0.06
4. Micronesia FSM 12.883 0.2498 0.05
3. Marshall Islands MHL - 0.1377 0.04
2. Tuvulu TUV - 0.0218 0.04
1. Nauru NRU - - 0.04
E-government Readiness Index takes values in the range of 0 to 1. A higher value of the index implies
better quality of e-governance. The data for total agricultural exports comes from United Nation's
COMTRADE database.
As can be seen in the table, some of the countries with the highest quality of e-governance
in the world are also among the largest exporters of agricultural commodities. For instance,
according to United Nation's E-government Survey Report (2005), the United States, Den-
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mark, Sweden, United Kingdom, and South Korea are amongst the top ﬁve countries in
the world with highest quality of e-governance. On the other hand, countries like Palau,
Micronesia, Marshall Island, Tuvalu, and Nauru are listed as the worst performing countries
in terms of e-governance. The E-government Readiness Index for all the countries in the
world is provided in the appendix.
As mentioned before, this system allows traders to ﬁle, transfer, and process customs
information online. It also allows them to submit their documents and to pay duties online
from anywhere in the world. This system improves the quality of service by reducing human
error and increasing convenience. At the same time this system reduces the probability
of direct interaction between the traders and the customs oﬃcials, thereby reducing the
incidence of bribery and discriminatory treatment. Thus, better port eﬃciency in terms
of technological infrastructure and the higher use of ICT for e-business in a country can
result in increased volume of trade. Based on the above-mentioned facts, the following is
hypothesized :
Hypothesis 1: A country's performance in agricultural exports will be aﬀected by en-
hanced e-governance.
Despite being one of the most important policy indicators in the trade literature, very
little research had been done to assess the eﬀect of trade facilitation on agricultural trade.
One reason behind this might be the limited cross-country data availability for e-governance.
Secondly, the lack of variation in an e-governance index makes it diﬃcult to conduct panel
analyses on the relationship between e-governance and agricultural trade. This paper seeks to
bridge the gap in the literature by studying the relationship between e-governance and agri-
cultural exports. An augmented gravity model is used, and diﬀerent estimation techniques
are combined to empirically investigate the impact of e-governance on bilateral agricultural
trade. The E-government Readiness Index constructed by United Nations is used as a proxy
for e-governance. The study is conducted on total agricultural exports for the years 2003 to
2005. To analyze the data, multiple regressions are used, and results are tested for robust-
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ness. To reduce omitted variable bias, a broad range of theoretically plausible determinants
of agricultural trade are also included in the model. Furthermore, Hekman's two-step method
and selection model are used to reduce the sample-selection bias present in the trade data.
Also, to deal with the issue of endogeneity, instrumental variable regression is used.
This paper contributes to the trade literature in two ways. First, according to a review
of the literature, this is the ﬁrst systematic cross-country empirical analysis that relates
e-governance to agricultural trade. Second, the paper proposes a novel instrument to deal
with the issue of endogeneity of e-governance.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
The relationship between the trade facilitation parameter and export performance is exam-
ined using an augmented gravity model. A gravity model of international trade is the most
commonly used approach for measuring bilateral trade between trading partners. Tinber-
gen (1962) pioneered the use of gravity equations in empirical estimations of bilateral trade
ﬂows. A standard gravity model assumes that the volume of trade between two countries
is positively related to the size of the economies and negatively related to the trade costs
between them. In its original form, the gravity model is expressed as:
Yei = G
(MeMi)
Dei
(2.1)
Where, Yij measures the trade ﬂow between country e and i, Me and Mi represents the
market size of country e and i respectively, D is the geographical distance between the
countries, and G is the gravitational constant. The market size of the economy is usually
measured by the GDP of the economy. The geographical distance between the countries is
used as a proxy for trade cost. Also, a number of additional dummy variables, including
island economy, landlocked economy, common language, common border, colonial heritage,
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income level or geographical region, are included in the model to capture trade factors.
In this paper, the E-government Readiness Index is used as a proxy for the quality of e-
governance in a country. Population is also included as a measure of country size. The index
already takes into account the quality of variables like port eﬃciency in terms of technological
infrastructure and the quality of human capital. It also takes into account the infrastructure
of the country to enable the eﬀective use of information and communication technology
(ICT) for e-business. It considers how each country takes advantage of the Internet to ease
or reduce the time and transaction costs associated with international trade. Therefore,
E-government Readiness Index transforms diﬀerent aspects of trade facilitation into a single
indicator which helps to reduce multicollinearity in the model. According to Wilson et al.,
(2010), From an econometric point of view, including variables related to trade facilitation,
measuring similar aspects on the right-hand side of a model, such as a gravity speciﬁcation,
can be conducive to multicollinearity. A way of circumventing multicollinearity is to reduce
the dimension of the data by aggregating highly correlated indicators into a single indicator.
Along with the main variable of interest, the E-government Readiness Index, this paper
controls for other variables that can inﬂuence the volume of trade. Since bilateral trade
involves two countries, the quality of e-governance prevailing in both countries can aﬀect the
outcome of the exchange. Therefore, a variable representing the quality of e-governance in
the partner country is also included in the model. It is widely recognized that the institutions
of a country play an important role in implementing policy reform measures in an economy
(Francois et al., 2013). As a proxy for institutions, the variable depicting the regulatory
quality in the economy is included in the model. A higher value of this variable implies
better quality of institutions in an economy. The analysis also controls for variables such as
bilateral tariﬀ rate and the exchange rate that have the potential to inﬂuence the volume of
agricultural trade.
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The basic gravity equation is given by the following:
Yeit = β0 +
∑
βkzk,ei + eit (2.2)
where, Yeit is value of trade ﬂows or the amount of export from country e to country i at
period t; zk,ei (k = 1, 2, . . . , K) correspond to the variables like e-governance, GDP,
population, distance, exchange rate etc.
In this paper the gravity equation takes the following form:
Exporteit = α + β1Egovernanceet + β2Egovernanceit + γ1GDPet
+ γ2 log(GDP )it + γ3 log(Population)et + γ4Populationit + γ5Distanceei
+ γ6Landlockede + γ7Languageei + γ8Colonyei + γ9Borderei + γ10Islande
+ γ11Incomee + γ12Regione + γ13ExchangeRateet + γ14Tariffiet
+ γ15RegQualityet + γ16RegQualityit + δei + eit (2.3)
Here, e and i represents the exporting and importing countries, respectively, and t denotes
time. Exporteit denotes volume of agricultural export from country e to country i at time
period t. Egovernanceet and Egovernanceit represents the quality of e-governance in the
exporting and importing counties, respectively, at period t. GDPet and GDPit are the real
GDP of country e and i, respectively, at time period t. Populationet and Populationit denote
population of country e and i, respectively, at time period t. Distanceei gives the distance
between the capital cities of the trading partners. Land is a binary dummy variable that takes
a value of unity if country e is landlocked. Languageei is a binary dummy variable which
is unity if country e and country i have a common language and zero otherwise. Colonyei
is a binary dummy which is unity if e and i had the same colonizer. Borderei is a binary
dummy variable which is unity if the trading partners share a common border. Islande is a
binary dummy taking a value of unity if country e is an island economy. Incomee represents
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the set of dummies representing the income group to which the exporting country belongs.
Regione represents the set of dummies representing the geographical region to which country
e belongs. Tariffiet is a weighted average tariﬀ applied by country i on country e's exports
at period t. ExchangeRateet represents the real exchange rate of country e quoted in the US
dollar. RegQualityet and RegQualityit controls for quality of institutions in the exporting
and importing country respectively. δei represents a set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. eit represents
the error term that is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero.
Given the multiplicative nature of the augmented gravity model, equation 2.3 is usually
transformed into log-linearized form. The log-linearized augmented gravity model is given
by the following equation:
log(Export)eit = α + β1 log(Egovernance)et + β2 log(Egovernance)it + γ1 log(GDP )et
+ γ2 log(GDP )it + γ3 log(Population)et + γ4 log(Population)it
+ γ5 log(Distance)ei + γ6Landlockede + γ7Languageei + γ8Colonyei
+ γ9Borderei + γ10Islande + γ11Incomee + γ12Regione
+ γ13 log(ExchangeRate)et + γ14 log(Tariff)iet + γ15 log(RegQuality)et
+ γ16 log(RegQuality)it + δei + eit (2.4)
The model is estimated using three-year panel data from 2003 to 2005. Real GDP is used as
a proxy for the size of the economy. The larger the size of the economy, the higher will be the
volume of agricultural trade between country pairs. Therefore, the coeﬃcient of log(GDP )
is expected to take a positive sign. The coeﬃcient for the log value of distance, which is
used as a proxy for trade cost is expected to be negative as the higher the distance the
higher will be the trade cost, thereby reducing the volume of trade between the countries.
As transportation costs are higher for islands or landlocked economies compared to the
countries sharing a common border, the volume of trade is expected to be higher in the last
case than in the other two instances. It is also assumed that the volume of trade will be
13
higher between the countries sharing similar cultural or colonial heritage. The same goes
for the country pairs belonging to the same income group or the same geographical region.
Again, the higher the population of the countries, the higher will be the demand for the
commodities. As a result, the coeﬃcient of log(Population) of the importing country is
expected to have a positive sign. The more the demand at home, the lower will be the
volume of exports. Therefore, with increasing population at home, the volume of export will
be lower. As a result, the coeﬃcient of log(Population) of the exporting country is expected
to take a negative sign. The coeﬃcient of regulatory quality is expected to be positive, as
it is assumed that better institutional quality promotes trade. As complex tariﬀ barriers
discourage trade, the coeﬃcient of the tariﬀ parameter is expected to take a negative sign.
The coeﬃcient of the exchange rate is also expected to take a negative sign. A higher value
of this variable implies that the value of the exporting country's currency appreciates in
terms of the US dollar. Appreciation of exporting country's currency will increase the price
of exports, and, therefore, the volume of exports will fall.
The log-linearized augmented gravity model is usually analyzed using Ordinary Least
Square (OLS) method, assuming that the homoscedastic error term is present in the model.
Panel techniques are also used to estimate the log-linearized gravity model assuming that
the error is constant across the countries or country-pairs (Herrera, 2010). However, the
traditional gravity model lacks the theoretical foundation that gives rise to two major impli-
cations. First, estimation results are biased due to omitted variables. Therefore, we will get
inconsistent OLS estimators. Omitted variable bias can also give rise to endogeneity. Sec-
ond, performing comparative statics exercises are diﬃcult (Anderson and Wincoop, 2003).
As there are countries that do not trade with each other, using the original gravity equation
gives rise to sample-selection bias. Also, the standard speciﬁcations of the gravity equation
impose symmetry that is inconsistent with the data resulting in biased estimates (Helpman
et al., 2006). The following sections review sample-selection bias and the issue of endogeneity
in details.
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2.2.1 Sample-selection Bias
In trade data, missing trade values are common as zero trade ﬂows may result from a
country's decision not to trade with another economy. The missing trade value creates a
problem when the log-linearized augmented gravity model is estimated using OLS. As the
log of zero is undeﬁned, zero trade ﬂows will be automatically dropped from the equation,
giving rise to sample-selection bias.2
To deal with the problem of sample-selection bias this paper follows Helpman et al.,
(2006), who use Heckman's two-step procedure to reduce the bias (Heckman, 1979). Initially,
a Probit Model (Selection equation) is estimated to determine the probability that a country
pair engages in trade. In the second stage, the expected values of the trade ﬂow from the
ﬁrst stage, conditional on the country pairs trading (Outcome equation), are estimated
using OLS. In order to correct the sample-selection bias or to identify the parameters in
both equations, an identiﬁcation variable is required. This variable should hold the property
that it inﬂuences a country's propensity to engage in trade but should not have any eﬀect
on its volume of trade. Previous literature suggests that variables such as common religion,
common border, common language, etc., satisfy this condition (Helpman et al., 2006).
Another way to deal with the sample-selection bias is to use Heckman's selection model
where the selection and the outcome equations are estimated simultaneously using Maximum
Likelihood Estimation. Heckman's selection model depends strongly on the model being
correctly speciﬁed. Heckman's selection model can produce biased estimates if the model is
not properly speciﬁed or if a speciﬁc dataset violates the model's assumptions. When the
underlying goal is to predict an actual response, Hekman's two-step model is preferred. If
the goal is to predict the value of the dependent variable that would be observed in the
absence of selection, however, Heckman's selection model is more appropriate.
2Alternative approaches to handle the presence of zero trade includes: i) Truncating the sample by
discarding the observations with zero trade values; and ii) Adding a small constant to each observation on
the dependent variable before taking logarithms. This method works properly if the zeros are randomly
distributed. Otherwise, this method gives rise to sample selection bias.
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2.2.2 Endogeneity
A considerable amount of empirical trade literature is plagued with the problem of en-
dogeneity, especially because of the presence of unobserved country-speciﬁc ﬁxed factors.
Endogeneity can also arise because of the possibilities of reverse causality. For example, a
country facing a higher volume of trade might ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to adopt the e-platform to
eﬃciently provide the service to the traders. Also, eﬃcient e-governance might positively
inﬂuence the volume of trade. This creates a circular causal chain between the trade facili-
tation variable and the volume of agricultural trade. E-governance can also be endogenous
because of the possibility of omitted variable bias. In the presence of endogeneity, OLS
estimation will give a biased result because the orthogonality assumption of OLS will be
violated (i.e. the explanatory variable will be correlated with the error term thereby giving
biased estimates).
In this paper, to deal with the problem of endogeneity, instrumental variable (IV) regres-
sion is used where a newly constructed variable on historical technological adoption from
the Cross-country Historical Adoption of Technology or CHAT data-set (Comin and Hobijn;
2009) is used as an instrument. Comin et al. (2010) compute indices of technology adoption
in 1000 BC, 0 AD, and 1500 AD. Out of these three time periods, they found that there is
a positive and signiﬁcant association between the technology adoption indices in 1500 AD
and technology adoption today. This relationship was found to be robust at the sector level
even after controlling for geographical and institutional factors. Also, there was a consid-
erable level of cross-country variation in technology adoption in 1500 AD. This measure of
historical technological adoption was computed in ﬁve diﬀerent sectors, namely agriculture,
transportation, military, industry, and communication. To identify the impact e-governance
on bilateral agricultural exports, this study includes technology adoption in communication
in 1500 AD as an instrument for technology adoption today (the adoption of e-governance
measures in the current period). To satisfy the condition for a valid instrument, this variable
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should hold the following properties: i) The technology adoption in communication in 1500
AD should be correlated with the potential endogenous variable e-governance; and ii) The
technology adoption in communication in 1500 AD should not have any direct impact on
the volume of agricultural exports during the period 2003 to 2005.
In this study, conventional Two-stage Least Square (2SLS) and Generalized Methods of
Moment (GMM) techniques are used for IV analysis.
2.3 Data
For the empirical estimation, bilateral agricultural export data (quoted in constant US dol-
lar) for the dependent variable is collected from the Commodity and Trade Database (COM-
TRADE) of the United Nations Statistics Division. The paper uses cross-country data and
constructs a panel data-set for 2003-2005. Agricultural goods are deﬁned as commodities in
Category 0 at the one-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC
Revision 1, Category 0).
This paper uses the e-government readiness index published by the United Nations as the
main explanatory variable. This data is derived from the United Nations Global E-readiness
reports and the E-government surveys which are produced by the Division for Public Ad-
ministration and Development Management (DPADM) of the United Nations Department
of Economic and Social Aﬀairs (DESA). The data is used for the years 2003, 2004, and 2005.
The e-government readiness index takes a value between zero and one. A value closer to zero
suggests a low quality of e-governance and a value closer to one implies a better quality of
the same.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is used as a measure of country size. The data for real
GDP (in constant US dollars) has been taken from the World Development Indicators pub-
lished by the World Bank. Population data also comes from the World Bank data-set. A
weighted average of bilateral applied tariﬀ rates, weighted by the values of bilateral agricul-
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tural trade, is used in this paper. The tariﬀ data were derived from the Trade Analysis and
Information System (TRAINS) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). Real exchange rate data comes from the World Bank. It is expressed in local
currency units relative to the US dollar.
Table 2.2 summarizes the relevant variables used in this paper.
Table 2.2: E-governance & Agricultural Exports: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
log(Export)ei 13.57 3.043 33865
log(E-governance)e -0.699 0.511 33925
log(E-governance)i -0.813 0.632 31783
log(GDP)e 25.14 2.116 34236
log(GDP)i 24.47 2.380 32681
log(Distance)ei 3.686 0.399 30713
log(Population)e 16.59 1.759 34236
log(Population)i 16.07 1.945 32984
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.388 1.936 21407
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 4.535 0.142 22131
log(Regulatory Quality)e -0.275 1.027 20902
log(Regulatory Quality)i -0.319 1.001 18007
1500 Technology Adoption Index_e 0.534 0.416 26464
1500 Technology Adoption Index_i 0.521 0.409 22282
Summary statistics are presented together for the years 2003 to 2005.
Variables capturing the variation in trade costs between country pairs such as distance,
common language, common border, colonial pasts, and other gravity model variables are
collected from the CEPII. The data for regulatory quality comes from World Bank's World-
wide Governance Indicators (WGI) database constructed by Kaufman et al. As described
by Kaufmann et al., (2004), the regulatory quality of a country reﬂects perceptions of the
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that
permit and promote private sector development. The value of regulatory quality ranges
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between -2.5 to 2.5. A value closer to -2.5 indicates weak regulatory quality and a value
closer to 2.5 suggests the quality of regulation is strong. The data source for the regional
and income category dummy is the World Bank.
The data source for the instrument is Comin et al. (2010). As previously mentioned, a
number of historical information sources are used to compute an index of cross-country tech-
nology adoption in 1000 BC, 0 AD, and 1500 AD. Technology adoption in 1500 AD was found
to be an accurate predictor of technology adoption today. This measure of historical techno-
logical adoption was computed in ﬁve diﬀerent sectors, namely agriculture, transportation,
military, industry, and communication. In this paper, the communication index was used
as an instrument for technology adoption today (e-governance). The communication index
is constructed using four variables: the use of movable block printing, the use of woodblock
printing, the use of books, and the use of paper. This variable takes a value between 0 and
1, where a value closer to zero suggests a lower degree of technology adoption in 1500 AD
and a value closer to one suggests that the degree of technology adoption was high during
1500 AD.
2.4 Results
Empirical estimates quantifying the eﬀect of e-governance on agricultural exports are re-
sented in this section. Before estimating the eﬀect of e-governance on agricultural exports,
the 1% tails of log value of agricultural exports across countries are trimmed. That is, all
countries are pooled and the top and bottom 1% of log value of agricultural exports in each
of the pools are trimmed. The ﬁrst column in each table includes standard gravity model
variables along with e-governance as main explanatory variable. The model also controls
for a number of variables to minimize the omitted variable bias. For example, in column 1
region and income dummies are included to rule out the possibility that these results are
driven by the omission of region and income ﬁxed factors. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of
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variables like population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. In column 3, two variables
representing the quality of regulation in the exporting and importing country respectively
are added. Finally, the last column controls for all the variables in the same speciﬁcation
along with time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. In terms of panel data, this ﬁxed eﬀect estimation
accounts for all sources of unobserved heterogeneity that are constant for a given year across
all countries. To deal with this issue of heteroscedasticity, robust clustered standard errors
are used. Standard errors are clustered by distance, which is unique to each country pair
but is identical for both trading partners.
2.4.1 Conventional Panel Data Techniques
As a benchmark, the gravity model is initially estimated using the Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) Method. Consistency of OLS requires that the error term to be uncorrelated with
the explanatory variables. Therefore, Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS) is consistent in
the Random Eﬀect (RE) model but is inconsistent in the Fixed Eﬀect (FE) model. In this
paper, due to the presence of time-invariant factors, the RE model is more appropriate than
the FE model. Thus, the estimates from the POLS model are assumed to be consistent in
this study.
The results from the POLS model are presented in Table 2.3. The coeﬃcient of e-
governance in the exporting country is highly signiﬁcant in each column with the expected
sign. This result suggests that e-governance of the exporting country has a positive and
signiﬁcant impact on the volume of exports. For example, in column 4, the coeﬃcient of e-
governance in the exporting country implies, a 1% improvement in the quality of e-governance
in the exporting country will increase the volume of agricultural exports by almost 4%.
However, in all the speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcient of e-governance in the importing country
remains insigniﬁcant with a negative sign. The standard gravity model variables also take
the expected sign, and the results are statistically signiﬁcant in almost all the cases.
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Table 2.3: E-governance & Agricultural Exports: Pooled OLS
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(E-governance)e 0.237*** 1.474*** 3.955*** 3.998***
(0.051) (0.297) (0.681) (0.688)
log(E-governance)i -0.046 -0.021 -0.266 -0.210
(0.034) (0.052) (0.361) (0.362)
log(GDP)e 0.636*** -0.008 -0.466** -0.445*
(0.018) (0.104) (0.175) (0.176)
log(GDP)i 0.674*** 0.789*** 0.861*** 0.860***
(0.012) (0.032) (0.084) (0.085)
log(Distance)ei -2.511*** -2.671*** -2.510*** -2.487***
(0.076) (0.125) (0.166) (0.168)
Common Colony_ei 1.266*** 1.016*** 0.694* 0.692*
(0.197) (0.231) (0.315) (0.315)
Island Economy_e -0.036 -0.727*** -0.452** -0.455**
(0.072) (0.129) (0.169) (0.169)
Landlocked Economy_e -0.880*** -0.756*** -0.983*** -0.989***
(0.084) (0.135) (0.179) (0.179)
Common Language_ei 0.717*** 1.047*** 1.426*** 1.426***
(0.081) (0.126) (0.180) (0.180)
Common Border_ei 1.352*** 1.034*** 0.679 0.691
-0.154 -0.268 -0.374 -0.377
log(Population)e 0.557*** 0.820*** 0.795***
(0.100) (0.185) (0.187)
log(Population)i -0.065 -0.068 -0.068
(0.036) (0.092) (0.093)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 1.143*** -0.483 -0.524
(0.329) (0.624) (0.624)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.013 0.028 0.030
(0.026) (0.035) (0.036)
log(Regulatory Quality)e 0.205* 0.199
(0.101) (0.102)
log(Regulatory Quality)i 0.190** 0.185**
(0.065) (0.066)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 21869 6437 2598 2598
Adjusted R2 0.429 0.424 0.522 0.522
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with e-governance as main ex-
planatory variable. It also includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect
of population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3, includes the quality of regulation
in each country. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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The results from the Pooled Feasible Generalized Least Square (PFGLS) Model are pre-
sented in Table 2.4. PFGLS estimation can lead to estimators of the parameters of the pooled
model that are more eﬃcient than POLS estimation in the presence of heteroscedasticity and
auto-correlation. Also, this model works well for an inﬁnite sample. Under the assumption
that any individual-level unobserved eﬀects are uncorrelated with regressors, PFGLS is con-
sistent. The PFGLS model also gives similar results relative to the POLS model. The result
presented in column 4 suggests that a 1% improvement in e-governance measures in the ex-
porting country will increase the volume of agricultural exports by almost 1.13%. However,
the impact of an importing country's e-governance remains insigniﬁcant. The standard grav-
ity model variables also take the expected sign, and the results are statistically signiﬁcant in
almost all the cases.
2.4.2 Heckman Model Estimates
Results from the Heckman Models are presented in this section. The results from the ﬁrst-
step of Heckman's two-step estimates are included in the appendix. The result shows the
identiﬁcation variable, the probability that two randomly drawn people from a country
pair speak the same language, to be an important determining factor for the country pairs
to engage in trade. Econometrically, this provides the necessary exclusion restriction for
identiﬁcation of the second stage trade ﬂow equation. Therefore the variable Common
Language is used as an exclusion variable in the construction of the Inverse Mills Ratio for
the second stage Heckman procedure.
Table 2.5 shows the second-stage results from Heckman's Two-step model. This model
reduces the bias from missing trade values. After controlling for the selection bias, the model
gives a positive and signiﬁcant estimate for the e-governance measure of exporting country.
This positive and signiﬁcant result is true for all the speciﬁcations.
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Table 2.4: E-governance & Agricultural Exports: Pooled FGLS
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(E-governance)e 0.030 0.982*** 1.129* 1.131*
(0.030) (0.270) (0.540) (0.532)
log(E-governance)i -0.010 -0.498** -0.091 -0.118
(0.020) (0.169) (0.416) (0.422)
log(GDP)e 0.563*** -0.182 -0.117 -0.092
(0.018) (0.101) (0.153) (0.180)
log(GDP)i 0.636*** 0.895*** 0.835*** 0.845***
(0.012) (0.060) (0.110) (0.111)
log(Distance)ei -2.306*** -2.373*** -2.163*** -2.156***
(0.077) (0.162) (0.215) (0.217)
Common Colony_ei 1.049*** 0.772** 0.880** 0.876**
(0.195) (0.245) (0.316) (0.317)
Island Economy_e 0.012 -0.600*** -0.695** -0.693**
(0.077) (0.175) (0.216) (0.216)
Landlocked Economy_e -0.928*** -0.744*** -0.956*** -0.969***
(0.095) (0.169) (0.213) (0.214)
Common Language_ei 0.658*** 0.987*** 1.188*** 1.188***
(0.085) (0.153) (0.239) (0.239)
Common Border_ei 1.118*** 0.999** 1.566*** 1.567***
(0.142) (0.336) (0.446) (0.448)
log(Population)e 0.650*** 0.381* 0.354
(0.104) (0.166) (0.199)
log(Population)i -0.073 0.047 0.037
(0.061) (0.121) (0.123)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 0.725* 0.076 0.002
(0.283) (0.442) (0.452)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.005 -0.038 -0.038
(0.025) (0.039) (0.039)
log(Regulatory Quality)e 0.398** 0.395*
(0.146) (0.155)
log(Regulatory Quality)i 0.214*** 0.212***
(0.058) (0.060)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 17766 3780 1764 1764
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with e-governance as main ex-
planatory variable. It also includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect
of population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3, includes the quality of regulation
in each country. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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Table 2.5: E-governance & Agricultural Exports: Heckman's Two-step Model.
Second-step Estimates
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(E-governance)e 0.330 1.025 3.557** 3.576**
(0.189) (0.718) (1.220) (1.225)
log(E-governance)i -0.123 -0.364 -0.622 -0.582
(0.170) (0.382) (0.813) (0.823)
log(Distance)ei -2.617*** -2.787*** -2.095*** -2.088***
(0.220) (0.361) (0.377) (0.376)
log(GDP)e 0.613*** 0.079 -0.751* -0.743*
(0.139) (0.240) (0.286) (0.291)
log(GDP)i 0.607*** 0.711*** 0.421 0.423
(0.069) (0.135) (0.263) (0.265)
log(Population)e 0.105 0.455 1.229*** 1.214**
(0.162) (0.275) (0.353) (0.360)
log(Population)i 0.031 -0.162 0.311 0.307
(0.061) (0.124) (0.263) (0.267)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 3.076*** 1.317 1.416
(0.534) (1.466) (1.527)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.067 0.034 0.033
(0.069) (0.092) (0.091)
log(Regulatory Quality)e 0.301 0.268
(0.246) (0.266)
log(Regulatory Quality)i 0.228 0.216
(0.190) (0.191)
Inverse Mills Ratio -1.749*** -1.560*** -0.983** -0.982**
(0.271) (0.356) (0.363) (0.364)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 2488 829 247 247
Adjusted R2 0.457 0.466 0.725 0.722
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with e-governance as main ex-
planatory variable. It also includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect
of population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3, includes the quality of regulation
in each country. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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For example, column 4 in Table 2.5 suggests that a 1% improvement in e-governance
measures in the exporting country will increase the volume of agricultural exports by almost
4%. However, the estimate for e-governance in the importing country initially suggests a
positive and signiﬁcant relationship, but after controlling for other relevant variables the
result becomes insigniﬁcant. The standard gravity model variables also take the expected
sign, and the results are statistically signiﬁcant in most of the cases.
Table 2.6 presents the results from Heckman's selection model. Similar to the two-step
model, this estimation strategy shows a positive and signiﬁcant impact of the e-governance of
exporting country on agricultural exports. The result further suggests that the e-governance
measure in the importing country can also inﬂuence the volume of exports positively. This
result is highly signiﬁcant for all the speciﬁcations.
2.4.3 IV Estimates
Table 2.7 reports the results of the 2SLS analysis using the 1500 communication technology
as an instrument for the technology adoption (e-governance) today. The coeﬃcient for e-
governance in the exporting country appears with the expected positive sign across diﬀerent
speciﬁcations and is statistically signiﬁcant. However, the coeﬃcient for e-governance in the
importing country still remains insigniﬁcant but takes a positive sign. The coeﬃcients from
the instrumental variable regression are somewhat larger than the OLS estimates suggesting
that OLS estimates were downwards biased due to the problem of endogeneity. Furthermore,
the F-statistic presented at the bottom of the table suggests that the instrument is strong
in each column (i.e., communication technology in 1500 AD is a signiﬁcant predictor of
e-governance today).
Table 2.8 reports the results from GMM analysis. The point estimates obtained using
GMM are very similar to the 2SLS estimates.
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Table 2.6: E-governance & Agricultural Exports: Heckman's Selection Model Estimates
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(E-governance)e 0.981*** 1.353*** 2.666*** 2.664***
(0.082) (0.130) (0.324) (0.323)
log(E-governance)i 0.841*** 0.550*** 3.831*** 3.831***
(0.069) (0.097) (0.271) (0.271)
log(Distance)ei 0.897*** 0.792*** 1.572** 1.588**
(0.089) (0.210) (0.480) (0.504)
Common Colony_ei -0.274 0.014 -0.121 -0.103
(0.149) (0.205) (0.369) (0.409)
Island Economy_e 0.039 0.387* 0.463 0.481
(0.077) (0.162) (0.429) (0.456)
Landlocked Economy_e 0.003 0.003 0.856 0.836
(0.081) (0.186) (0.546) (0.526)
Common Language_ei -0.392*** -0.606*** -0.185 -0.205
(0.081) (0.172) (0.596) (0.611)
Common Border_ei -0.448** -0.481 -0.552 -0.573
(0.137) (0.283) (0.444) (0.45)
log(GDP)e -0.217*** -0.011 0.650* 0.674*
(0.020) (0.110) (0.296) (0.291)
log(GDP)i -0.319*** -0.546*** -0.720** -0.732***
(0.036) (0.106) (0.221) (0.217)
log(Population)e -0.025 -0.222* -1.028** -1.055**
(0.020) (0.112) (0.330) (0.342)
log(Population)i 0.044 0.176* 0.222 0.236
(0.026) (0.075) (0.162) (0.158)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -0.532 0.442 0.363
(0.339) (2.007) (2.021)
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.003 -0.058 -0.057
(0.039) (0.062) (0.059)
log(Regulatory Quality)e -0.801 -0.851
(0.435) (0.452)
log(Regulatory Quality)e 0.104 0.111
(0.170) (0.192)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Rho 0.782 0.834 0.956 0.956
Inverse Mills Ratio 2.309 2.290 2.341 2.341
Observations 22728 6715 2732 2732
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with e-governance as main ex-
planatory variable. It also includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect
of population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3, includes the quality of regulation
in each country. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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Table 2.7: E-governance & Agricultural Exports: IV Analysis (2SLS)
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(E-governance)e 10.05*** -31.28*** 44.07*** 44.09***
(1.307) (9.055) (10.02) (9.841)
log(E-governance)i 2.524 3.592 -0.934 0.201
(1.460) (2.574) (3.918) (3.909)
log(GDP)e 0.170* 6.305*** -6.914*** -6.653***
(0.067) (1.754) (1.633) (1.568)
log(GDP)i 0.292 -0.392 1.173 1.063
(0.263) (0.744) (0.664) (0.658)
log(Distance)ei -3.019*** -2.299*** -3.157*** -2.946***
(0.150) (0.518) (0.507) (0.493)
Common Colony_ei 1.222*** 1.804 0.536 0.530
(0.334) (1.006) (0.737) (0.729)
Island Economy_e -1.670*** 1.964** 0.707 0.687
(0.225) (0.610) (0.558) (0.549)
Landlocked Economy_e -1.358*** -0.397 -0.216 -0.219
(0.179) (0.333) (0.398) (0.394)
Common Language_ei 0.556** 0.605 1.384** 1.423**
(0.174) (0.449) (0.490) (0.496)
Common Border_ei 2.156*** 0.593 -0.373 -0.231
(0.446) (0.550) (0.822) (0.821)
log(Population)e -5.068** 7.434*** 7.119***
(1.574) (1.675) (1.604)
log(Population)i 0.962 -0.261 -0.173
(0.626) (0.574) (0.569)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -1.832 -13.45*** -13.14***
(1.322) (3.782) (3.726)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.246** 0.281* 0.275*
(0.094) (0.140) (0.137)
log(Regulatory Quality)e -1.898** -2.086**
(0.637) (0.640)
log(Regulatory Quality)i 0.323 0.207
(0.245) (0.243)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 13234 4542 1669 1669
Wald F statistics 38.73 16.94 25.93 28.12
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Instrumented variables: log(E-governance)e, log(E-governance)e. The ﬁrst column includes stan-
dard gravity model variables along with e-governance as main explanatory variable. It also includes
region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of population, real exchange rate,
and tariﬀ structure. Column 3, includes the quality of regulation in each country. The last column
controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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Table 2.8: E-governance & Agricultural Exports: IV Analysis (GMM)
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(E-governance)e 10.05*** -31.28*** 44.07*** 44.09***
(1.307) (9.055) (10.02) (9.841)
log(E-governance)i 2.524 3.592 -0.934 0.201
(1.460) (2.574) (3.918) (3.909)
log(GDP)e 0.170* 6.305*** -6.914*** -6.653***
(0.067) (1.754) (1.633) (1.568)
log(GDP)i 0.292 -0.392 1.173 1.063
(0.263) (0.744) (0.664) (0.658)
log(Distance)ei -3.019*** -2.299*** -3.157*** -2.946***
(0.150) (0.518) (0.507) (0.493)
Common Colony_ei 1.222*** 1.804 0.536 0.530
(0.334) (1.006) (0.737) (0.729)
Island Economy_e -1.670*** 1.964** 0.707 0.687
(0.225) (0.610) (0.558) (0.549)
Landlocked Economy_e -1.358*** -0.397 -0.216 -0.219
(0.179) (0.333) (0.398) (0.394)
Common Language_ei 0.556** 0.605 1.384** 1.423**
(0.174) (0.449) (0.490) (0.496)
Common Border_ei 2.156*** 0.593 -0.373 -0.231
(0.446) (0.550) (0.822) (0.821)
log(Population)e -5.068** 7.434*** 7.119***
(1.574) (1.675) (1.604)
log(Population)i 0.962 -0.261 -0.173
(0.626) (0.574) (0.569)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -1.832 -13.45*** -13.14***
(1.322) (3.782) (3.726)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.246** 0.281* 0.275*
(0.094) (0.140) (0.137)
log(Regulatory Quality)e -1.898** -2.086**
(0.637) (0.640)
log(Regulatory Quality)i 0.323 0.207
(0.245) (0.243)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 13234 4542 1669 1669
Wald F statistics 38.73 16.94 25.93 28.12
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Instrumented variables: log(E-governance)e, log(E-governance)e. The ﬁrst column includes stan-
dard gravity model variables along with e-governance as main explanatory variable. It also includes
region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of population, real exchange rate,
and tariﬀ structure. Column 3, includes the quality of regulation in each country. The last column
controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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2.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to identify the relationships between e-governance and bilateral
agricultural exports. In doing so, this study used an augmented gravity model framework.
The study also employed diﬀerent methodologies to quantify the eﬀect of e-governance on
bilateral agricultural exports for a broad set of countries. The sample-selection bias present
in the trade data was corrected using Heckman's procedures. To deal with the issue of
endogeneity, the study used Instrumental Variable Regression. According to the ﬁndings
of the study, the quality of e-governance in the exporting country can positively inﬂuence
the volume of agricultural exports across borders. This result was robust to all the model
speciﬁcations. However, the study found a signiﬁcant impact of the quality of e-governance
in the importing country only after correcting for sample-selection bias.
From a policy implication point of view, this study gives quite important results. Adopt-
ing information and communication technology (ICT) to provide service to the citizen im-
proves the eﬀectiveness and accountability of the government. Trimming down unnecessary
trade impediments by applying modern techniques and technologies also plays a crucial role
in facilitating trade. The initiative to make trade across border paperless" simpliﬁes trade
procedures and improves the quality of controls. Reducing or eliminating paper documents
and allowing traders to ﬁle, transfer, and process customs information online enhances the
quality of service by reducing human error and increasing convenience. This system also
reduces the volume and impact of red tape, associated with wasteful and time-consuming
bureaucracy. At the same time, this system reduces the probability of direct interaction
between the traders and the customs oﬃcials, thereby reducing the incidence of bribery and
discriminatory treatment. Moreover, unlike tariﬀ elimination that results in the loss of tariﬀ
revenues, eliminating non-tariﬀ barriers are rewarding to all the trading partners.
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Chapter 3. The Role of Corruption on
Bilateral Agricultural Trade
3.1 Introduction
Corruption is an enduring phenomenon that is ingrained in a wide variety of socio-economic,
cultural, and political factors. It is commonly deﬁned as the abuse of public oﬃce for
private gain1. Corruption can be present in various forms such as bribery, extortion, evasion,
cronyism, nepotism, graft, embezzlement, etc. It unethically helps increase the private gain
of an individual who is in charge of a public oﬃce. Corruption is considered as one of the
major obstacles in achieving the goals of public policies for both the developing countries
and developed nations. It has adverse impacts on a nation's economic growth (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1993), government expenditure, or per capita GDP (Mauro, 1995, 1998). By raising
the transaction cost and uncertainty, corruption also hinders long-run foreign and domestic
investment in an economy (Wei, 2000). Corruption gives rise to inequality and also elevates
poverty (Gupta, et al., 2002). Despite these negative impressions, many economists argue
that corruption can be beneﬁcial for the economy. Some economists (Leﬀ, 1964; Huntington
1968; mentioned by Mauro, 1995) have suggested that corruption raises economic growth.
They argue that by removing government-imposed rigidities that hinder growth, corruption
enhances the eﬃciency of the otherwise complicated system (Leﬀ, 1964; Meon and Weill,
2008).
Though in most of the cases detecting corruption is very diﬃcult, there are a few inter-
national organizations that publish corruption indices based on the perception of the people.
According to the corruption indices published by the Worldwide Governance Indicators and
Transparency International (The Control of Corruption Index (CCI) and Corruption Per-
1Visit: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm
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ception Index (CPI) respectively), not a single country in the world is entirely free from
corruption. While a large proportion of countries are comparatively less corrupt, none of the
countries has a perfect score. For example, in 2010, Denmark had both the highest score
in CPI, 9.30 out of the maximum possible 10 (least corrupt) and the highest score in CCI,
2.41 out of the maximum possible 2.5 (least corrupt). While in the same year, Somalia had
the lowest scores, a CPI of 1.10 (the lowest possible score is 0), and a CCI of -1.74 (-2.5 is
the lowest possible score). Table 3.1 lists the ﬁve least and the most corrupt countries in
descending order of corruption as measured by the CCI.
Table 3.1: Least and Most Corrupt Countries in the World, 2010
Country Trade Control of Corruption
Rank Country Code Value Corruption Perception
(million US $) Index Index
Least corrupt countries according to 2010 CCI
1. Denmark DNK 16006.05 2.41 9.30
2. New Zealand NZL 15297.78 2.40 9.30
3. Sweden SWE 6186.42 2.32 9.20
4. Singapore SGP 4002.45 2.21 9.30
5. Finland FIN 1488.61 2.18 9.20
Most corrupt countries according to 2010 CCI
5. Turkmenistan TKM - -1.45 1.60
4. Equatorial Guinea GNQ - -1.49 1.90
3. Afghanistan AFG 130.94 -1.62 1.40
2. Myanmar MMR 1420.60 -1.68 1.40
1. Somalia SOM - -1.74 1.10
The CCI takes values in the range of -2.5 to 2.5, and CPI takes values in the range of 0 to 10.
A higher value of both the indices implies lower corruption. The data for total agricultural ex-
ports comes from United Nation's COMTRADE database. Trade value is measured in current
US dollars.
As can be seen in the table, some of the least corrupt countries of the world are also some
of the highest exporters of agricultural commodities. For instance, Denmark, New Zealand,
Sweden, Singapore, and Finland are amongst the ﬁve least corrupt countries in the world
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according to the 2010 Control of Corruption Index. A detailed discussion on CCI and CPI
are included in the appendix.
While there is plethora of empirical literature analyzing the causes and the consequences
of corruption, cross-national empirical research studying the eﬀect of corruption on interna-
tional trade is rare. The literature is even scarcer if we consider the relationship between
corruption and agricultural trade. This paper contributes to the trade literature by measur-
ing the extent to which corruption aﬀects agricultural exports across the borders. Using an
augmented gravity model, this paper investigates the role of corruption on bilateral agricul-
tural exports for a broad set of countries, spanning ﬁve years from 2006 to 2010. According
to the review of the literature, this is the ﬁrst cross-country empirical analysis that relates
indicators of a country's decadence to its performance in agricultural trade.
3.2 Corruption in International Trade
It is widely recognized that the institutional quality plays an important role in implementing
policy measures in an economy. Eﬃcient government institutions foster economic growth
(Mauro, 1995). Institutional quality also plays a major role in determining the volume of
trade across borders (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2000). Weak institutions give incentives
for corrupt oﬃcials to exploit their discretionary power to extract or create rents (Aidt,
2003). The level of corruption represents the quality of institutions in an economy. In
international trade, corruption prevails mostly in the form of bureaucratic corruption or
government corruption where customs oﬃcers demand or accept bribes and in return sell
government properties.
Two types of bribes plague the customs administrations around the world. Customs
oﬃcials often demand bribes for doing something that they are supposed to do. The corrupt
customs oﬃcer in authority to give customs clearance purposefully delays the process to
attract more bribes. In the corruption literature, this process is known as extraction (Dutt
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and Traca, 2009). Sometimes in countries with protectionist trade policies and cumbersome
rules and regulations, traders oﬀer bribes to customs oﬃcials to reduce the tariﬀ or other
regulatory barriers to trade. This situation in which customs oﬃcials accept bribes for
doing something that they are not entitled to do is known as evasion (Dutt and Traca,
2009). Bribery in international trade acts as a hidden tax and results in an unreported
trade. Corruption at the border reduces trade by increasing the transaction cost and also
the price of the traded commodity. As mentioned by John and Bogmans (2011), In low-
income countries in which a large share of government revenue is collected through customs,
corrupt customs oﬃcials reduce trade and deprive the government of revenue. According to
the African Development Bank, Every year $1 trillion is paid in bribes while an estimated
$2.6 trillion are stolen annually through corruption, a sum equivalent to more than 5% of
the global GDP.2
Trade literature suggests that the eﬀect of corruption on international trade is mixed.
Economists suggest that a protectionist trade policy leads to increased levels of bureaucratic
corruption. In countries with complex tariﬀ structure, bribes are seen as a way out from
cumbersome rules and regulations. In countries with protectionist trade policy, bribes, re-
ferred to as speed money, enable individuals to avoid bureaucratic delays and help improve
eﬃciency (Bardhan, 1997). Also, irrespective of the level of red tape in a country, if the
bribe acts as a piece rate, the customs oﬃcials who are allowed to levy bribes would work
harder thereby increasing the eﬃciency of the system (Leﬀ, 1964; Huntington, 1968). Some
economists argue that oﬀering speed money to the oﬃcials helps establishing a custom in
the economy where the oﬃcials intentionally delay the license until the bribe is paid. The
corrupt customs oﬃcials intentionally introduce new rules and regulations to extract more
bribes (Krueger, 1993). Therefore, although practices like paying speed money might induce
government workers to work hard and help individuals avoid delays at the border, the custom
of paying bribes adversely aﬀects the economy as a whole.
2Visit: http://www.afdb.org/en/
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In his paper, Dutt (2009) found evidence that countries with protectionist trade policies
face a higher level of corruption. His ﬁnding supports the notion that trade liberalization
can lead to better governance and thereby reduced levels of corruption. Jong and Bogmans
(2011) investigate the eﬀect of corruption on international trade for both the importing and
exporting country. They found that corruption has an overall negative impact on trade but
bribe-paying to customs enhances imports.
Lambsdorﬀ (1998) found that the degree of corruption of the importing country signif-
icantly aﬀects the export performance of a country. For some countries, his result shows a
positive relationship between corruption and export performance, but for a few other na-
tions the corruption and export performance moves in the opposite direction. Lambsdorﬀ
(1999) reinforces his earlier ﬁndings and shows that some countries have a signiﬁcantly lower
market share in countries which are corrupt. He concludes that these diﬀerences arise due
to a diﬀerent willingness of exporters to oﬀer bribes.
Since customs procedures can considerably increase the transit time between origin and
destination, the extraction and evasion at the borders can play a major role in facilitating
or hindering international trade. A study by Martincus et al. (2011) ﬁnds that a 10%
increase in the median time spent in customs results in a 1.8% decline in the growth rate of
exports. The eﬀects are particularly acute for exports of time-sensitive products. Therefore,
it is expected that corruption at the border will have a negative impact on the volume of
international trade. On the other hand, if the trade policies are cumbersome and if the
quality of customs is low, corruption can facilitate international trade.
Though few economists have investigated the impact of corruption on trade related to
service sectors or manufactured goods, there are scant empirical studies that address how
corruption might inﬂuence the volume of agricultural trade across the borders. Agricultural
commodities are usually perishable in nature, although the degree of perishability varies.
Along with increasing transaction costs, delays in trade have an impact on the market price
of agricultural commodities. Longer waits in customs to get clearance will inﬂuence the price
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of the traded goods and, thereby, can inﬂuence the volume of exports. The exporter of a
commodity that is highly perishable in nature will have a greater propensity to pay a bribe.
Also to avoid the delays at the border that result in higher inventory holding costs, the
exporters will be willing to pay the bribe. This propensity to pay or accept bribes increases
with the level of corruption prevailing in the exporting or the importing country.
Therefore, it can be argued that the level of corruption prevailing in a country can
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the volume of trade across the border. So it is important to study the
impact of corruption on agricultural trade between nations. This paper tries to ﬁll this void
in the trade literature by studying the impact of corruption on bilateral agricultural exports.
Speciﬁcally, this paper examines the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The level of corruption prevailing in a country will have a signiﬁcant impact
on the volume of agricultural trade.
This paper uses an augmented gravity model and combines diﬀerent estimation tech-
niques to empirically investigate the impact of corruption on bilateral agricultural trade.
Using diﬀerent measures of corruption, this paper attempts to measure the extent to which
corruptions aﬀect the trade performance of a country. In this paper the Control of Cor-
ruption (CCI) Index, constructed by Worldwide Governance Indicators, is used as the main
explanatory variable. For sensitivity analysis, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is used
as a proxy for corruption. To analyze the data, multiple regressions are used and results are
tested for robustness. To reduce the omitted variable bias, a broad range of theoretically
plausible determinants of agricultural trade are also included in the model. To deal with the
endogeneity issue, the instrumental variable approach is used in this paper. Furthermore,
Hekman's two-step and Heckman's selection models are used to reduce the sample-selection
bias present in the model.
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3.3 Empirical Strategy
To study the relationship between the level of corruption prevailing in a country and the
volume of agricultural exports, the augmented gravity model is used in this paper. The
gravity model of international trade pioneered by Tinbergen (1962) is expressed as:
Yei = G
(MeMi)
Dei
(3.1)
A standard gravity model assumes that the volume of trade between two countries is
positively related to the size of the economies and negatively related to the trade costs
between them. Here, Yij measures the trade ﬂow between country e and i, Me and Mi
represents the size of country e and i respectively, D is the geographical distance between
the countries, that captures trade costs. G is the gravitational constant. The market size of
the economy is usually measured by the GDP of the country.
Additional dummy variables, including island economy, landlocked economy, common
language, a common border, colonial heritage, income level or geographical region are in-
cluded in the model to capture trade factors. The population is also included as a measure
of country size. In this paper, the level of corruption in a country is used as a proxy for
the quality institutions. Along with the main variable of interest, this paper controls for
other variables that can inﬂuence the volume of trade. Since bilateral trade involves two
countries, the quality of institutions prevailing in both the countries can aﬀect the outcome
of the exchange. Therefore, a variable representing the level of corruption prevailing in the
partner country is included in the model. The model also controls for variables such as
bilateral import tariﬀ and the exchange rate that have the potential to inﬂuence the vol-
ume of agricultural trade. In this paper, a weighted average of bilateral applied tariﬀ rates,
weighted by the values of bilateral agricultural trade, is used as a measure of a country's
tariﬀ structure. This study includes two interaction term between tariﬀ structure and the
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corruption index for exporting and importing countries respectively in the model. Since a
complex tariﬀ structure gives customs oﬃcials' incentive to demand bribes and also gives
incentive to the foreign exporters to oﬀer bribes, it is necessary to include the interaction
terms in the model.
In this paper the log-linearized augmented gravity equation takes the following form:
log(Export)eit = α + β1Corruptionet + β2Corruptionit + γ1 log(GDP )et + γ2 log(GDP )it
+ γ3 log(Population)et + γ4 log(Population)it + γ5 log(Distance)ei
+ γ6Landlockede + γ7Languageei + γ8Colonyei + γ9Borderei + γ10Islande
+ γ11Incomee + γ12Regione + γ13 log(ExchangeRate)et + γ14 log(Tariff)iet
+ γ15 log(Tariff)iet × Corruptionet + γ16 log(Tariff)iet × Corruptionit
+ δei + eit (3.2)
Here, e and i represents the exporting and importing countries, respectively, and t denotes
time. Exporteit denotes volume of agricultural export from country e to country i at time
period t. Corruptionet and Corruptionit denote level of corruption in country e and i,
respectively, at period t. GDPet and GDPit are the real GDP of country e and i, respectively,
at time period t. Populationet and Populationit denote population of country e and i,
respectively, at time period t. Distanceei gives the distance between the capital cities of
country e and i. Land is a binary dummy variable that takes a value of unity if country e is
landlocked. Languageei is a binary dummy variable which is unity if country e and country
i have a common language and zero otherwise. Colonyei is a binary dummy which is unity
if e and i had the same colonizer. Borderei is a binary dummy variable which is unity if e
and i share a common border. Islande is a binary dummy taking a value of unity if country
e is an island economy. Incomee represents the set of dummies representing the income
group to which country e belongs. Regione represents the set of dummies representing the
geographical region to which country e belongs. Tariffiet is a weighted average tariﬀ applied
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by country i on country e's exports at period t. ExchangeRateet represents the real exchange
rate of country e quoted in the US dollar. δei is a set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. eit is the error
term that is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero.
The model is estimated using ﬁve-year panel data from 2006 to 2010. It is expected
that corruption will have a negative impact on the volume of international trade. In that
case, the coeﬃcient of the corruption parameter is expected to take a positive sign (a higher
value of the corruption index implies the country is less corrupt). Therefore, the positive
coeﬃcient of the corruption index should capture the trade-taxing extortion eﬀect. On
the other hand, if the trade policies are cumbersome and if the quality of customs is low,
corruption can facilitate international trade. As a result, the coeﬃcient of the corruption
index is expected to take a negative sign. Also, a negative coeﬃcient on the (corruption ×
tariﬀ) interaction term captures the trade-enhancing evasion eﬀect. This negative coeﬃcient
implies that corruption can be trade enhancing when the level of tariﬀs rises above a certain
threshold level (Dutt and Traca, 2009).
As mentioned earlier, GDP is used as a proxy for the size of the economy. The larger
the economy, the higher will be the volume of agricultural trade between country pairs.
Therefore, the coeﬃcient of log(GDP ) is expected to be positive. The coeﬃcient for the
log value of distance, which is used as a proxy for trade cost is expected to be negative as
higher distance increases the trade cost, thereby reducing the volume of trade between the
countries. As transportation costs are higher for islands or landlocked economies compared
to the countries sharing a common border, the volume of trade is expected to be higher in
the last case than in the other two instances. It is also assumed that the volume of trade
will be higher between the countries sharing similar cultural or colonial heritage. The same
goes for the country pairs belonging to the same income group or the same geographical
region. Again, the higher the population of the countries, the higher will be the demand for
the commodities. As a result, the coeﬃcient of log(Population) of the importing country
is expected to have a positive sign. The more the demand at home, the lower will be the
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volume of exports. Therefore, with increasing population at home, the volume of export will
be lower. As a result, the coeﬃcient of log(Population) of the exporting country is expected
to take a negative sign. As complex tariﬀ barriers discourage trade, the coeﬃcient of the
tariﬀ parameter is therefore expected to take a negative sign. The coeﬃcient of the exchange
rate is also expected to take a negative sign. A higher value of this variable implies that the
value of the exporting country's currency appreciates in terms of the US dollar. With an
appreciation of the domestic currency, the price of its exports increases. Therefore, a higher
value of a country's exchange rate will negatively inﬂuence its exports.
In this paper, the log-linearized augmented gravity model is initially estimated using the
benchmark Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. Panel estimation methods like population
averaged Feasible Generalized Least Square (Pooled FGLS) and Random Eﬀect Models are
also used to study the relationship between corruption and agricultural trade. Next, sample-
selection bias arising from missing trade values is then corrected using Heckman's two-step
model and Heckman's Selection model. To alleviate potential endogeneity present in the
model, instrumental variable regression is then used.
3.3.1 Sample-selection bias
In trade data, sample-selection bias is common due to the presence of missing trade values.
Zero trade ﬂows may result from a country's decision not to trade with another economy. As
the log of zero is undeﬁned, the missing trade value creates a problem when the log-linearized
augmented gravity model is estimated using OLS. Zero trade ﬂows will be automatically
dropped from the log-linearized equation, giving rise to sample-selection bias.3
To alleviate sample-selection bias, this paper follows Helpman et al., (2006), who use
Heckman's two-step procedure to reduce this bias (Heckman, 1979). In Heckman's two-step
3Alternative approaches to handle the presence of zero trade includes: i) Truncating the sample by
discarding the observations with zero trade values; and ii) Adding a small constant to each observation on
the dependent variable before taking logarithms. This method works properly if the zeros are randomly
distributed. Otherwise, this method gives rise to sample selection bias.
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model, Probit estimation is conducted in the ﬁrst-stage to determine the probability of a
country pair engaging in trade. In the second stage of the estimation, the expected values
of the trade ﬂow from the ﬁrst stage, conditional on that country pairs are trading, are
estimated using OLS. In this two-step model, to identify the parameters in both equations,
an identiﬁcation variable is required. The variable should hold the property that it inﬂuences
a country's propensity to engage in trade but should not have any eﬀect on its volume of
trade. Previous literature suggests that variables like common religion, common language
etc. satisfy this condition (Helpman et al., 2006).
In this paper, Heckman's selection model is also used to deal with the sample-selection
bias. In this model, the selection and the outcome equations are estimated simultaneously
using Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Heckman's selection model depends strongly on the
model being correctly speciﬁed. Heckman's selection model can produce biased estimates if
the model is not properly speciﬁed or if a speciﬁc dataset violates the model's assumptions.
When the underlying goal is to predict an actual response, Hekman's two-step model is
preferred. If the goal is to predict the value of the dependent variable that would be observed
in the absence of selection, however, Heckman's selection model is more appropriate.
3.3.2 Endogeneity
The cross-country correlation suggests a possible causal relationship between the volume of
trade and the level of corruption prevailing in a country. The level of corruption in a country
and the volume of trade might be determined simultaneously. For example, a higher degree
of corruption can lower the volume of trade, or larger volume of trade might reduce the level
of corruption prevailing in a country. This creates a circular causal chain between corruption
and the volume of agricultural trade, giving rise to endogeneity.
In the augmented gravity model, the level of corruption can also be endogenous to the
volume of agricultural trade because of the possibility of omitted variable bias, especially
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arising due to the presence of unobserved country-speciﬁc ﬁxed factors. These unobserved
country-speciﬁc factors pose the biggest challenge in the empirical corruption literature,
owing to the invariability of corruption indices over time. This invariability of corruption
indices makes it infeasible to carry out a panel study in corruption. In the presence of
endogeneity, OLS estimation gives a biased result as the orthogonality assumption is violated.
To deal with the issue of endogeneity, this paper uses Instrumental Variable (IV) re-
gression. An index of Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) is used as an instrument. The
choice of instrument is guided by theoretical and economical ﬁndings by diﬀerent economists.
Development economists suggest that ethnic diversity or ethnolinguistic fractionalization
leads to political instability and poor economic performance (Feraon, 2002). It lowers a
country's economic growth rate or level of the public goods provision (Alesina et al., 1997).
A higher degree of ethnic diversity also results in an increased level of corruption in an econ-
omy. Ethnically diverse societies are more likely to engage in non-collusive bribery, which
is more harmful than the collusive bribery present in a homogenous society (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1993). According to Mauro (1995), Ethnic conﬂict may lead to political instability
and, in extreme cases, to civil war. The presence of many diﬀerent ethnolinguistic groups
is also signiﬁcantly associated with worse corruption, as bureaucrats may favor members of
their same group.
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index measures the probability that two ran-
domly selected persons from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic
group (Mauro, 1995). The higher the value of ELF index, the more fragmented the country
will be. For this variable to work as an instrument, it should be true that the ELF index
is highly correlated with the corruption index, and it should not have any direct impact on
the volume of bilateral export or import. Here it is assumed that ELF will directly inﬂuence
the level of corruption in a country but will not have any direct impact on the volume of
agricultural exports.
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This paper uses the ELF index for 1961 constructed by Roeder (2001) as an instrument
for corruption. Roeder (2001) provides ethnic diversity data for 150 countries. This ELF
index is constructed mainly based on Atlas Narodov Mira, published by Soviet ethnographers
in 1964 together with other Soviet ethnographic studies from the 1980s (Roeder 2001).
The ELF index given by the following equation is constructed using the Taylor and
Hudson (1972) formula. A fractionalization index, FRAC, is deﬁned as,
ELF = 1 −
n∑
i=1
Π2i (3.3)
Where, Πi is the proportion of people belonging to the ethnic group i . Lower the value
of Πi, the higher will be the value of ELF, and the more fragmented the country will be.
According to the corruption literature, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization will lead to
higher level of corruption.
3.4 Data
To undertake the empirical investigation, this paper uses cross-country data and constructs a
panel dataset. The bilateral trade ﬂow data for the dependent variable is collected from the
Commodity and Trade Database (COMTRADE) of the United Nations Statistics Division
for 2006 to 2010 for total agricultural exports. Agricultural goods are deﬁned as commodities
in Category 0 at the one-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC
Revision 1, Category 0). All data are expressed in current US dollar.
This paper uses the Control of Corruption Index (CCI) as the primary measure of cor-
ruption. The CCI comes from the worldwide governance indicators (WGI) constructed by
Kaufmann et al., (2010). They describe the purpose of CCI in that it Reﬂects perceptions
of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and
grand forms of corruption, as well as `capture' of the state by elites and private interests."
The CCI takes a value in the range of -2.5 (most corrupt) to 2.5 (least corrupt).
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To conduct the sensitivity analysis, the paper includes the Corruption Perception Index
(CPI) constructed by Transparency International as a measure of corruption. According to
Transparency International, corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It
hurts everyone who depends on the integrity of people in a position of authority." Trans-
parency International collects data from a number of diﬀerent surveys that report the per-
ceived level of corruption in the public sector in diﬀerent countries. The CPI index ranges
from 0 to 10 where, zero implies a country is highly corrupt, and ten implies a country is
almost clean. Table 3.2 summarizes the relevant variables used in this paper.
Table 3.2: Corruption & Agricultural Exports: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
log(Export)ei 13.98 3.138 61595
CorruptionCCI_e 0.307 1.062 62817
CorruptionCCI_i 0.139 1.062 61847
CorruptionCPI_e 4.864 2.313 60825
CorruptionCPI_i 4.461 2.285 58222
log(GDP)e 25.55 2.072 61752
log(GDP)i 24.82 2.345 60667
log(Distance)ei 3.691 0.392 56777
log(Population)e 16.62 1.747 62292
log(Population)i 16.07 1.964 61890
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 4.589 0.076 39172
log(Tariﬀ)ie 2.097 1.294 29365
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index_e 0.417 0.273 53146
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index_i 0.436 0.267 57256
Summary statistics are presented together for the years 2006 to 2010.
The tariﬀ data were derived from the Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS)
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Real exchange
rate data comes from the World Bank. It is expressed in local currency units relative to the
US dollar. The data for GDP has been taken from World Development Indicators published
43
by the World Bank. Population data also comes from the World Bank data-set. Variables
capturing the variation in trade costs between country pairs such as distance, common
language, common border, colonial pasts, and other gravity model variables comes from the
CEPII. The data for ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, which is used as an instrument
for corruption is provided by Roeder (2001).
3.5 Results
In this section, the full regression results quantifying the eﬀect of corruption on agricultural
exports are presented. Here, Control of Corruption Index (CCI) is used as a proxy for the
level of corruption. Before estimating equation 3.2, the 1% tails of log value of agricultural
exports across countries are trimmed. That is, all countries are pooled and the top and
bottom 1% of log value of agricultural exports in each of the pools are trimmed. The
ﬁrst column in each table includes standard gravity model variables along with the level
of corruption as the main explanatory variable. Next, the model controls for a number of
variables to minimize the omitted variable bias. Column 1 also includes region and income
dummies to rule out the possibility that these results are driven by the omission of region and
income ﬁxed factors. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of variables such as population, real
exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interaction terms between tariﬀ
structure and the level of corruption in the exporting and importing countries respectively.
Finally, the last column presents results of regressions which control for all the variables in
the same speciﬁcation along with time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. In terms of panel data, this ﬁxed
eﬀect estimation accounts for all sources of unobserved heterogeneity that are constant for a
given year across all countries. To deal with this issue of heteroscedasticity, robust clustered
standard errors are used. Standard errors are clustered by distance, which is unique to each
country pair but is identical for both trading partners.
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3.5.1 Conventional Panel Data Techniques
Initially, the gravity model is estimated using the benchmark Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
method. Consistency of OLS requires the error term to be uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables. Therefore, Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS) is consistent in the Random
Eﬀect (RE) model but is inconsistent in the Fixed Eﬀect (FE) model. In this paper, due to
the presence of time-invariant factors, the RE model is more appropriate than the FE model.
Thus, the estimates from the POLS model are assumed to be consistent in this study.
The results from POLS model are presented in Table 3.3. The coeﬃcient of corruption
in the exporting country is highly signiﬁcant in each column with the expected positive sign.
This result suggests that the level of corruption in the exporting country has a signiﬁcant
and negative impact on the volume of exports (i.e., the more corrupt a country is, the
lower will be the volume of agricultural exports). For example, in column 4, the coeﬃcient
of corruption in the exporting country suggests that an increase in the corruption ranking
by one (becoming less corrupt) will increase the volume of agricultural exports by almost
84%. However, the corruption level in the importing country does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
volume of agricultural exports. This can be true because the exporters will have a higher
propensity to pay a bribe as they have to sell their product. Irrespective of the level of
corruption in their own country or in the partner country, exporters will always be willing
to pay a bribe. Therefore, they will be willing to trade even with a country which is highly
corrupt. On the other hand the importing country has the option to choose a trading partner
which is less corrupt.
As mentioned earlier, the positive coeﬃcient of the corruption index captures the trade-
taxing extortion eﬀect. Moreover, the positive coeﬃcient of the interaction term between
tariﬀ structure and the level of corruption does not show any evidence of a trade enhancing
evasion eﬀect.
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Table 3.3: Corruption (CCI) & Agricultural Exports: Pooled OLS
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCCI_e 0.902*** 0.759*** 0.843*** 0.841***
(0.050) (0.075) (0.092) (0.093)
CorruptionCCI_i 0.113*** 0.055 -0.055 -0.057
(0.034) (0.054) (0.069) (0.069)
log(GDP)e 0.146** -0.018 -0.023 -0.018
(0.055) (0.089) (0.089) (0.093)
log(GDP)i 0.610*** 0.670*** 0.667*** 0.668***
(0.023) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
log(Distance)ei -2.772*** -2.822*** -2.808*** -2.809***
(0.074) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
Island Economy_e -0.151* -0.395*** -0.399*** -0.399***
(0.068) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
Landlocked Economy_e -1.097*** -0.700*** -0.699*** -0.700***
(0.084) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130)
Common Colony_ei 1.267*** 0.355 0.360 0.359
(0.190) (0.406) (0.407) (0.408)
Common Language_ei 0.699*** 1.014*** 1.016*** 1.016***
(0.077) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
Common Border_ei 1.127*** 0.911*** 0.890*** 0.890***
(0.149) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235)
log(Population)e 0.597*** 0.668*** 0.673*** 0.668***
(0.059) (0.099) (0.099) (0.104)
log(Population)i 0.073** 0.019 0.029 0.028
(0.026) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.118***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.034)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 1.992*** 1.990*** 1.999***
(0.357) (0.356) (0.360)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_e -0.039 -0.039
(0.022) (0.022)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_i 0.069** 0.069**
(0.025) (0.025)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 41171 14373 14373 14373
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.416 0.417 0.417
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with CCI as the main explana-
tory variable. It also includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of
population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interaction terms be-
tween tariﬀ structure and the level of corruption. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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The results from the Pooled Feasible Generalized Least Square (PFGLS) model are pre-
sented in Table 3.4. PFGLS estimation can lead to estimators of the parameters of the
pooled model that are more eﬃcient than POLS estimation in the presence of heteroscedas-
ticity and auto-correlation. Also, this model works well for an inﬁnite sample. Under the
assumption that any individual-level unobserved eﬀects are uncorrelated with the regressors,
PFGLS is consistent. The PFGLS model also gives results similar to the POLS model.
3.5.2 Heckman Model Estimates
Results from the Heckman Models are presented in this section. The results from the ﬁrst-
step of Heckman's two-step estimates are included in the appendix. The result shows the
identiﬁcation variable, the probability that two randomly drawn people from a country
pair speak the same language, to be an important determining factor for the country pairs
to engage in trade. Econometrically, this provides the necessary exclusion restriction for
identiﬁcation of the second stage trade ﬂow equation. Therefore the variable Common
Language is used as an exclusion variable in the construction of the Inverse Mills Ratio for
the second stage Heckman procedure.
Table 3.5 shows the second-stage results from Heckman's Two-step model. After correct-
ing for the selection bias arising due to missing trade values, the coeﬃcient for the level of
corruption in the exporting country takes the expected positive sign. The positive coeﬃ-
cient for the corruption index captures the trade-taxing extortion eﬀect and suggests that
the level of corruption in the exporting country will reduce the volume of exports. The neg-
ative coeﬃcient of the interaction term between tariﬀ structure and the level of corruption
suggests that trade enhancing evasion eﬀect can be present in the model, but the result is
not highly signiﬁcant. However, the estimate for corruption in the importing country still
remains insigniﬁcant but takes a positive sign after controlling for other variables.
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Table 3.4: Corruption (CCI) & Agricultural Exports: Pooled FGLS
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCCI_e 0.412*** 0.293*** 0.358*** 0.458***
(0.038) (0.069) (0.081) (0.086)
CorruptionCCI_i 0.019 0.038 -0.009 0.039
(0.028) (0.052) (0.065) (0.067)
log(GDP)e 0.557*** 0.595*** 0.593*** 0.329***
(0.036) (0.079) (0.079) (0.099)
log(GDP)i 0.640*** 0.661*** 0.661*** 0.610***
(0.019) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037)
log(Distance)ei -2.579*** -2.648*** -2.641*** -2.647***
(0.073) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133)
Island Economy_e -0.131 -0.256* -0.260* -0.233
(0.073) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122)
Landlocked Economy_e -1.087*** -0.812*** -0.812*** -0.734***
(0.092) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149)
Common Language_ei 0.676*** 1.086*** 1.080*** 1.062***
(0.078) (0.121) (0.120) (0.120)
Common Border_ei 0.928*** 0.706** 0.683** 0.632*
(0.138) (0.251) (0.251) (0.251)
Common Colony_ei 1.007*** 0.463 0.470 0.523
(0.200) (0.428) (0.434) (0.423)
log(Population)e 0.059 -0.008 -0.006 0.267*
(0.042) (0.088) (0.088) (0.107)
log(Population)i 0.022 0.014 0.016 0.062
(0.023) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.122*** -0.104*** -0.106***
(0.025) (0.031) (0.031)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -0.126 -0.121 -0.001
(0.219) (0.219) (0.224)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_e -0.030 -0.029
(0.019) (0.019)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_i 0.031 0.030
(0.022) (0.023)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 35099 9542 9542 9542
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with CCI as the main explana-
tory variable. It also includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of
population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interaction terms be-
tween tariﬀ structure and the level of corruption. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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Table 3.5: Corruption (CCI) & Agricultural Exports: Heckman's Two-step Model.
Second-step Estimates
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCCI_e 0.987*** 1.198*** 1.463*** 1.463***
(0.182) (0.231) (0.248) (0.252)
CorruptionCCI_i -0.176 -0.008 0.099 0.104
(0.111) (0.144) (0.191) (0.194)
log(GDP)e 0.278 0.123 0.092 0.086
(0.154) (0.230) (0.232) (0.244)
log(GDP)i 0.717*** 0.716*** 0.717*** 0.716***
(0.069) (0.102) (0.101) (0.103)
log(Distance)ei -2.836*** -3.040*** -2.974*** -2.974***
(0.230) (0.375) (0.383) (0.384)
log(Population)e 0.493** 0.414 0.451 0.458
(0.182) (0.267) (0.269) (0.282)
log(Population)i -0.083 -0.033 -0.025 -0.023
(0.078) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 1.347 1.365 1.321
(0.715) (0.712) (0.730)
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.067 0.140 0.142
(0.074) (0.089) (0.089)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_e -0.122* -0.123*
(0.050) (0.050)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_i -0.048 -0.049
(0.077) (0.074)
Inverse Mills Ratio -1.556*** -1.253** -1.247** -1.249**
(0.248) (0.469) (0.470) (0.470)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 4636 1944 1944 1944
Adjusted R2 0.450 0.450 0.452 0.452
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with CCI as the main explana-
tory variable. It also includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of
population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interaction terms be-
tween tariﬀ structure and the level of corruption. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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The standard gravity model variables also take the expected sign, and the results are
statistically signiﬁcant in most of the cases.
Table 3.6 presents the results from Heckman's selection model. Similar to the two-step
model, this estimation strategy shows a positive and signiﬁcant impact of corruption of
exporting country on agricultural exports. The result further suggests that the e-governance
measure in the importing country can also inﬂuence the volume of exports positively. This
result is highly signiﬁcant for all speciﬁcations.
3.5.3 IV Estimates
Table 3.7 reports the results of the 2SLS analysis using ethnolinguistic fractionalization
(ELF) index as an instrument for corruption. The coeﬃcient for corruption in the exporting
country appears with the expected positive sign across diﬀerent speciﬁcations and is statis-
tically signiﬁcant. After controlling for causality and omitted variable bias, the coeﬃcient
for corruption in the importing country becomes signiﬁcant and takes the expected positive
sign. The positive coeﬃcient of the corruption index captures the trade-taxing extortion
eﬀect and suggests that the higher level of corruption prevailing in the exporting country
will reduce the volume of exports. Also, the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the inter-
action term between tariﬀ structure and the level of corruption, suggests corruption can be
trade enhancing in the presence of complex tariﬀ structures. Here the coeﬃcients from the
instrumental variable regression are somewhat larger than the OLS estimates suggesting that
OLS estimates were downwards biased due to the problem of endogeneity. Furthermore, the
F-statistic presented at the bottom of the Table 3.7 suggests that the instrument is strong
in each column (i.e., the more fragmented a country is in terms of ethnicity, the more severe
will be the level of corruption). Table 3.8 reports the results from GMM analysis. The point
estimates obtained from using GMM are very similar to the 2SLS estimates.
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Table 3.6: Corruption (CCI) & Agricultural Exports: Heckman's Selection Model
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCCI_e 0.401*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261***
(0.025) (0.038) (0.038) 0(0.038)
CorruptionCCI_i 0.434*** 0.399*** 0.399*** 0.399***
(0.028) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
log(Distance)ei 0.826*** 0.797*** 0.799*** 0.799***
(0.077) (0.171) (0.169) (0.168)
Common Colony_ei -0.272 -0.236 -0.267 -0.266
(0.147) (0.248) (0.252) (0.250)
Island Economy_e -0.011 0.052 0.075 0.076
(0.054) (0.117) (0.115) -0.115
Landlocked Economy_e -0.07 -0.122 -0.103 -0.100
(0.058) (0.127) (0.131) (0.132)
Common Language_ei -0.260*** -0.481*** -0.502*** -0.500***
(0.072) (0.129) (0.128) (0.128)
Common Border_ei -0.518*** -0.489* -0.453* -0.452*
-0.114 -0.219 -0.220 -0.220
log(GDP)e -0.202*** -0.106 -0.101 -0.097
(0.025) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
log(GDP)i -0.181*** -0.320*** -0.318*** -0.316***
(0.023) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
log(Population)e -0.044 -0.269*** -0.280*** -0.284***
(0.027) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
log(Population)i -0.102*** -0.025 -0.035 -0.036
(0.024) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -0.803 -0.751 -0.733
(0.421) (0.410) (0.424)
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.015 -0.002 -0.002
(0.033) (0.042) (0.042)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_e 0.056* 0.056*
(0.023) (0.024)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_i -0.032 -0.032
(0.025) (0.026)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Rho 0.726 0.763 0.771 0.771
Inverse Mills Ratio 2.227 2.184 2.209 2.206
Observations 43404 15049 15049 15049
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with CCI as the main explana-
tory variable. It also includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of
population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interaction terms be-
tween tariﬀ structure and the level of corruption. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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Table 3.7: Corruption (CCI) & Agricultural Exports: IV Analysis (2SLS)
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCCI_e 3.378** 2.720*** 4.360*** 4.498***
(1.206) (0.707) (1.206) (1.205)
CorruptionCCI_i 9.664 2.688** 2.946** 2.515**
(7.496) (1.035) (0.997) (0.906)
log(GDP)e -0.846 -1.203** -1.357** -1.543**
(0.469) (0.427) (0.478) (0.515)
log(GDP)i -4.382 -0.421 0.0668 0.158
(3.925) (0.441) (0.218) (0.202)
log(Distance)ei -4.293*** -3.796*** -3.750*** -3.722***
(0.990) (0.266) (0.242) (0.228)
Common Colony_ei -1.878 1.022 0.843 0.786
(2.546) (0.578) (0.548) (0.530)
Island Economy_e -0.224 -0.147 -0.154 -0.113
(0.151) (0.115) (0.115) (0.120)
Landlocked Economy_e -2.101** -1.181*** -1.060*** -1.061***
(0.671) (0.183) (0.160) (0.155)
Common Language_ei 0.688*** 0.776*** 0.736*** 0.739***
(0.122) (0.109) (0.111) (0.108)
Common Border_ei 0.241 0.158 0.043 0.0224
(0.558) (0.230) (0.252) (0.249)
log(Population)e 1.890** 2.143*** 2.370*** 2.574***
(0.592) (0.524) (0.593) (0.631)
log(Population)i 5.599 1.243* 0.753** 0.646**
(4.341) (0.490) (0.252) (0.232)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 2.110*** 2.090*** 1.595***
(0.381) (0.385) (0.438)
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.115 0.721** 0.642**
(0.098) (0.264) (0.239)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_e -0.595** -0.596***
(0.184) (0.178)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_i -0.680** -0.570**
(0.244) (0.220)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 32378 11962 11962 11962
Wald F statistics 0.951 10.02 13.76 15.42
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Instrumented variables: CorruptionCCI_e, CorruptionCCI_i. The ﬁrst column includes standard
gravity model variables along with CCI as the main explanatory variable. It also includes region
and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of population, real exchange rate, and
tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interaction terms between tariﬀ structure and the level of
corruption. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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Table 3.8: Corruption (CCI) & Agricultural Exports: IV Analysis (GMM)
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCCI_e 3.378** 2.720*** 4.360*** 4.498***
(1.202) (0.710) (1.196) (1.192)
CorruptionCCI_i 9.664 2.688** 2.946** 2.515**
(7.346) (1.039) (1.008) (0.911)
log(GDP)e -0.846 -1.203** -1.357** -1.543**
(0.473) (0.432) (0.477) (0.512)
log(GDP)i -4.382 -0.421 0.067 0.158
(3.846) (0.441) (0.221) (0.204)
log(Distance)ei -4.293*** -3.796*** -3.750*** -3.722***
(0.974) (0.269) (0.247) (0.232)
Common Colony_ei -1.878 1.022* 0.843* 0.786*
(2.489) (0.419) (0.380) (0.369)
Island Economy_e -0.224 -0.147 -0.154 -0.113
(0.151) (0.114) (0.111) (0.117)
Landlocked Economy_e -2.101** -1.181*** -1.060*** -1.061***
(0.665) (0.190) (0.166) (0.161)
Common Language_ei 0.688*** 0.776*** 0.736*** 0.739***
(0.119) (0.108) ((0.105) (0.101)
Common Border_ei 0.241 0.158 0.043 0.0224
(0.554) (0.226) (0.245) (0.243)
log(Population)e 1.890** 2.143*** 2.370*** 2.574***
(0.595) (0.530) (0.591) (0.628)
log(Population)i 5.599 1.243* 0.753** 0.646**
(4.254) (0.492) (0.257) (0.235)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 2.110*** 2.090*** 1.595***
(0.373) (0.385) (0.431)
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.115 0.721** 0.642**
(0.100) (0.270) (0.243)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_e -0.595** -0.596***
(0.184) (0.177)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_i -0.680** -0.570**
(0.247) (0.221)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 32378 11962 11962 11962
Wald F Statistics 1.005 9.338 14.48 16.49
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Instrumented variables: CorruptionCCI_e, CorruptionCCI_i. The ﬁrst column includes standard
gravity model variables along with CCI as the main explanatory variable. It also includes region
and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of population, real exchange rate, and
tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interaction terms between tariﬀ structure and the level of
corruption. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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3.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3.9 to 3.14 presents the results with an alternative measure of corruption, the Cor-
ruption Perception Index (CPI), published by Transparency International. CPI takes values
between 1 to 10 where a higher value implies a lower level of corruption and viceversa. The
point estimates obtained using the CPI as a measure of corruption are very similar to the
estimates from the regressions using CCI. This signiﬁcant and comparable estimates using
CPI strengthens the conﬁdence in the estimated coeﬃcients from the previous sections.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper investigated the eﬀect of corruption on bilateral agricultural exports. The aug-
mented gravity model was used to identify the relationship between corruption and agricul-
tural trade. The study found a trade-taxing extortion eﬀect of corruption prevailing in the
exporting country that suggests that the higher level of corruption is associated with reduced
agricultural exports. However, the trade-taxing extortion eﬀect was insigniﬁcant for the cor-
ruption in the importing country. After correcting for sample selection bias and endogeneity,
the study found that the level of corruption in both the exporting and importing country
will have a signiﬁcant and negative impact on the volume of agricultural exports. Also, the
negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the interaction term between the tariﬀ structure and
the level of corruption suggest that corruption can be trade enhancing in the presence of
complex tariﬀ structures. Therefore, according to the ﬁndings of this paper, corruption can
be trade-taxing when the protection level is low, but with the degree of protection higher
than a threshold level, it becomes trade-enhancing. The results were robust for diﬀerent
measures of corruption.
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Table 3.9: Corruption (CPI) & Agricultural Exports: Pooled OLS.
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCPI_e 0.288*** 0.284*** 0.321*** 0.320***
(0.022) (0.033) (0.041) (0.041)
CorruptionCPI_i 0.073*** 0.066** 0.006 0.005
(0.016) (0.025) (0.032) (0.032)
log(GDP)e 0.243*** -0.046 -0.051 -0.044
(0.059) (0.096) (0.095) (0.099)
log(GDP)i 0.602*** 0.642*** 0.635*** 0.636***
(0.024) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
log(Distance)ei -2.662*** -2.782*** -2.762*** -2.764***
(0.079) (0.117) (0.118) (0.118)
Island Economy_e -0.138 -0.419*** -0.422*** -0.422***
(0.071) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Landlocked Economy_e -1.062*** -0.730*** -0.730*** -0.732***
(0.088) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
Common Colony_ei 1.248*** 0.394 0.405 0.402
(0.189) (0.419) (0.419) (0.420)
Common Language_ei 0.674*** 1.006*** 1.010*** 1.010***
(0.081) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107)
Common Border_ei 1.229*** 0.903*** 0.882*** 0.882***
(0.155) (0.245) (0.245) (0.245)
log(Population)e 0.465*** 0.677*** 0.681*** 0.674***
(0.063) (0.105) (0.105) (0.108)
log(Population)i 0.073** 0.045 0.057 0.056
(0.027) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.118*** -0.215* -0.215*
(0.028) (0.097) (0.097)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 2.027*** 2.024*** 2.037***
(0.369) (0.368) (0.372)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_e -0.018 -0.018
(0.011) (0.011)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_i 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.012) (0.012)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 37892 13469 13469 13469
Adjusted R2 0.424 0.411 0.413 0.413
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with CPI as the main explana-
tory variable. It also includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of
population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interaction terms be-
tween tariﬀ structure and the level of corruption. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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Table 3.10: Corruption (CPI) & Agricultural Exports: Pooled FGLS
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCPI_e 0.048** 0.029 0.024 0.031
(0.016) (0.029) (0.039) (0.040)
CorruptionCPI_i 0.022* 0.019 -0.021 -0.014
(0.009) (0.016) (0.027) (0.027)
log(GDP)e 0.626*** 0.643*** 0.633*** 0.474***
(0.038) (0.083) (0.082) (0.106)
log(GDP)i 0.631*** 0.654*** 0.658*** 0.633***
(0.018) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034)
log(Distance)ei -2.449*** -2.511*** -2.494*** -2.483***
(0.078) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140)
Island Economy_e -0.129 -0.271* -0.271* -0.262*
(0.076) (0.127) (0.126) (0.127)
Landlocked Economy_e -1.008*** -0.796*** -0.802*** -0.763***
(0.098) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160)
Common Language_ei 0.636*** 1.034*** 1.038*** 1.027***
(0.083) (0.126) (0.126) (0.125)
Common Border_ei 1.000*** 0.736** 0.734** 0.711**
(0.143) (0.259) (0.259) (0.259)
Common Colony_ei 1.058*** 0.556 0.561 0.595
(0.193) (0.447) (0.443) (0.441)
log(Population)e -0.046 -0.101 -0.092 0.066
(0.045) (0.093) (0.092) (0.114)
log(Population)i 0.010 -0.014 -0.018 0.002
(0.022) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.124*** -0.235** -0.236**
(0.026) (0.086) (0.087)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -0.157 -0.152 -0.087
(0.233) (0.233) (0.237)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_e 0.003 0.004
(0.009) (0.009)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_i 0.019 0.018
(0.011) (0.011)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 32132 8879 8879 8879
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with CPI as the main explana-
tory variable. It also includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of
population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interaction terms be-
tween tariﬀ structure and the level of corruption. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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Table 3.11: Corruption (CPI) & Agricultural Exports: Heckman's Two-step Model.
Second-step Estimates
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCPI_e 0.270** 0.403*** 0.502*** 0.502***
(0.083) (0.110) (0.124) (0.126)
CorruptionCPI_i -0.059 0.029 0.067 0.066
(0.051) (0.063) (0.091) (0.091)
log(GDP)e 0.337* 0.125 0.103 0.119
(0.161) (0.247) (0.250) (0.262)
log(GDP)i 0.717*** 0.706*** 0.705*** 0.708***
(0.071) (0.104) (0.103) (0.105)
log(Distance)ei -2.845*** -2.862*** -2.820*** -2.830***
(0.249) (0.416) (0.421) (0.424)
log(Population)e 0.435* 0.398 0.423 0.406
(0.188) (0.282) (0.284) (0.296)
log(Population)e 0.099 0.046 0.033 0.034
(0.083) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 1.640* 1.662* 1.637*
(0.762) (0.761) (0.780)
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.088 0.420 0.422
(0.080) (0.293) (0.294)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_e -0.048 -0.049
(0.027) (0.027)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_i -0.017 -0.017
(0.036) (0.036)
Inverse Mills Ratio -1.660 -1.458 -1.445 -1.435
(0.254) (0.485) (0.486) (0.487)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 4223 1787 1787 1787
Adjusted R2 0.445 0.432 0.434 0.433
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with CPI as the main explana-
tory variable. It also includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of
population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interaction terms be-
tween tariﬀ structure and the level of corruption. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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Table 3.12: Corruption (CPI) & Agricultural Exports: Heckman's Selection Model
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCPI_e 0.188*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
CorruptionCPI_i 0.240*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.252***
(0.013) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
log(Distance)ei 0.868*** 0.820*** 0.820*** 0.821***
(0.078) (0.172) (0.170) (0.170)
Common Colony_ei -0.274 -0.167 -0.196 -0.196
(0.144) (0.258) (0.264) (0.263)
Island Economy_e -0.014 0.077 0.096 0.097
(0.055) (0.121) (0.119) (0.119)
Landlocked Economy_e -0.130* -0.156 -0.135 -0.133
(0.062) (0.136) (0.140) (0.140)
Common Language_ei -0.228** -0.469*** -0.481*** -0.481***
(0.073) (0.132) ((0.130) (0.130)
Common Border_ei -0.489*** -0.480* -0.451* -0.450*
(0.115) (0.220) (0.221) (0.221)
log(GDP)e -0.243*** -0.172** -0.171** -0.170**
(0.025) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
log(GDP)i -0.187*** -0.294*** -0.289*** -0.289***
(0.023) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
log(Population)e -0.012 -0.197*** -0.203*** -0.204***
(0.025) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
log(Population)i -0.107*** -0.052 -0.063 -0.063
(0.024) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -0.849* -0.791 -0.787
(0.423) (0.412) (0.417)
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.009 -0.005 -0.005
(0.035) (0.114) (0.115)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_e 0.022* 0.022*
(0.011) (0.011)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_i -0.021 -0.020
(0.012) (0.012)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Rho 0.723 0.748 0.756 0.756
Inverse Mills Ratio 2.214 2.129 2.154 2.154
Observations 40041 14116 14116 14116
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with CPI as the main explana-
tory variable. It also includes region and income dummies are included. Column 2, controls for
the eﬀect of population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interac-
tion terms between tariﬀ structure and the level of corruption. The last column controls for time
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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Table 3.13: Corruption (CPI) & Agricultural Exports: IV Analysis (2SLS)
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCPI_e 1.185*** 1.347*** 2.250*** 2.309***
(0.152) (0.307) (0.581) (0.582)
CorruptionCPI_i 0.745* 0.954** 1.332** 1.199**
(0.322) (0.313) (0.407) (0.382)
log(GDP)e -0.723*** -1.468*** -1.627** -1.797***
(0.178) (0.425) (0.509) (0.542)
log(GDP)i -0.152 -0.151 0.070 0.134
(90.36) (0.287) (0.194) (0.184)
log(Distance)ei -3.188*** -3.671*** -3.765*** -3.751***
(0.126) (0.202) (0.239) (0.232)
Common Colony_ei 0.871*** 0.753* 0.662 0.619
(0.241) (0.354) (0.391) (0.392)
Island Economy_e 0.057 0.027 0.021 0.061
(0.049) (0.137) (0.149) (0.155)
Landlocked Economy_e -1.420*** -1.179*** -1.037*** -1.051***
(0.102) (0.164) (0.152) (0.152)
Common Language_ei 0.586*** 0.800*** 0.705*** 0.703***
(0.052) (0.095) (0.109) (0.108)
Common Border_ei 0.924*** 0.361 0.063 0.038
(0.105) (0.189) (0.249) (0.250)
log(Population)e 1.604*** 2.375*** 2.596*** 2.778***
(0.201) (0.499) (0.604) (0.639)
log(Population)e 0.900* 0.928** 0.752*** 0.677**
(0.396) (0.313) (0.221) (0.209)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 1.171** 1.121* 0.632
(0.451) (0.519) (0.608)
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.071 3.464*** 3.283***
(0.076) (1.005) (0.946)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_e -0.340*** -0.342***
(0.095) (0.095)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_i -0.292** -0.260**
(0.099) (0.092)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 30093 11390 11390 11390
Wald F Statistics 19.39 20.76 17.48 18.75
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Instrumented variables: CorruptionCPI_e, CorruptionCPI_i. The ﬁrst column includes standard
gravity model variables along with CPI as the main explanatory variable. In column 2, region and
income dummies are included. Column 3, controls for the eﬀect of population, real exchange rate,
and tariﬀ structure. Column 4 includes the interaction terms between tariﬀ structure and the level
of corruption. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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Table 3.14: Corruption (CPI) & Agricultural Exports: IV Analysis (GMM)
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCPI_e 1.185*** 1.347*** 2.144*** 2.309***
(0.152) (0.307) (0.548) (0.582)
CorruptionCPI_i 0.745* 0.954** 1.143** 1.199**
(0.322) (0.313) (0.353) (0.382)
log(GDP)e -0.723*** -1.468*** -1.627** -1.797***
(0.178) (0.425) (0.509) (0.542)
log(GDP)i -0.152 -0.151 0.0701 0.134
(90.36) (0.287) (0.194) (0.184)
log(Distance)ei -3.188*** -3.671*** -3.765*** -3.751***
(0.126) (0.202) (0.239) (0.232)
Common Colony_ei 0.871*** 0.753* 0.662 0.619
(0.241) (0.354) (0.391) (0.392)
Island Economy_e 0.057 0.027 0.021 0.061
(0.049) (0.137) (0.149) (0.155)
Landlocked Economy_e -1.420*** -1.179*** -1.037*** -1.051***
(0.102) (0.164) (0.152) (0.152)
Common Language_ei 0.586*** 0.800*** 0.705*** 0.703***
(0.052) (0.095) (0.109) (0.108)
Common Border_ei 0.924*** 0.361 0.063 0.038
(0.105) (0.189) (0.249) (0.250)
log(Population)e 1.604*** 2.375*** 2.596*** 2.778***
(0.201) (0.499) (0.604) (0.639)
log(Population)e 0.900* 0.928** 0.752*** 0.677**
(0.396) (0.313) (0.221) (0.209)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 1.171** 1.121* 0.632
(0.451) (0.519) (0.608)
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.0711 3.464*** 3.283***
(0.076) (1.005) (0.946)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_e -0.340*** -0.342***
(0.095) (0.095)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_i -0.292** -0.260**
(0.099) (0.092)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 30093 11390 11390 11390
Wald F Statistics 19.39 20.76 17.87 18.75
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Instrumented variables: CorruptionCPI_e, CorruptionCPI_i. The ﬁrst column in each table in-
cludes standard gravity model variables along with CPI as the main explanatory variable. It also
includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of population, real exchange
rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interaction terms between tariﬀ structure and the
level of corruption in the exporting and importing countries respectively. Finally, the last column
controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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For trade and institutional reforms, these results have important policy implications.
The presence of protectionist trade policies provides bureaucrats with the opportunity to
extract bribes. It also increases the incentive for foreign ﬁrms to evade tariﬀs by oﬀering
bribes to the customs oﬃcials. In such situations, one option for the government is to
liberalize international trade. Trade liberalization has the potential to alleviate corruption
by removing opportunities for rent-seeking activities. Moreover, the government can adopt
trade facilitation reforms to reduce the volume and impact of red tape and to enhance
the transparency of the system. By applying modern techniques and technologies, trade
facilitation measures help lessen the probability of direct interaction between the traders
and the customs oﬃcials, thereby deterring corrupt activities. Unlike tariﬀ elimination that
results in the loss of tariﬀ revenues, embracing trade facilitation measures are rewarding for
all the trading partners. Similarly, an improvement of the governance structure, an increase
in the quality of human capital, or increased freedom of press, among other actions that have
the potential to dissuade corruption can be trade-enhancing.
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Chapter 4. The Role of the Internet on
Bilateral Agricultural Trade
4.1 Introduction
The Internet, a comparatively new mode of contact, has changed forever the way people
communicate around the globe. The Internet plays a pivotal role in matching buyers and
sellers and thereby reducing search costs. It acts as a new medium of advertising and helps
in providing information to the potential buyers. It plays a signiﬁcant role in exchanging
information or ideas among agents. The Internet oﬀers a platform for technological advance-
ment and improves infrastructure, thereby reducing ﬁxed costs. Lower ﬁxed costs can help
existing players as well as encourage new entrants in the markets (Freund and Weinhold,
2004). Another crucial impact of the Internet is its growing role in improving human capital
by giving better and more diverse access to information. The Internet is also believed to play
a signiﬁcant role in enabling innovation and productivity. By reducing transaction costs, it
enables businesses to better utilize existing resources. Therefore, the Internet helps integrate
the global economy by allowing countries to acquire and share ideas, knowledge, expertise,
services, and technologies (Unwin, 2009).
The past few years have experienced an unprecedented growth in the use of the Internet.
While, in 1995, only 0.4% of the world population had access to the Internet, by the end of
2014 this ﬁgure reached 42.4%1. With the growing popularity of the Internet in the past few
decades, exploring the impact of the Internet has become necessary from the perspective of
the policymakers. Given the beneﬁts of using the Internet as a medium of communication, it
can be argued that the Internet has an enormous potential in facilitating trade. By lowering
ﬁxed costs, the Internet can facilitate trade for existing players as well as encourage new
1Visit: http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm
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traders in the markets. Also, by making communication faster and information more easily
available, the Internet can inﬂuence the transit time between the origin and the destination.
Though important, studies analyzing the impact of Internet access on bilateral trade are
rare. The central idea of this paper is to ﬁll this void in the trade literature by quantifying
the probable eﬀect of the Internet on bilateral trade, both in agricultural commodities and
non-agricultural goods. Using an augmented gravity model, this paper combines diﬀerent es-
timation techniques to empirically investigate the impact of Internet penetration on bilateral
trade for a broad set of countries, spanning ﬁve years from 2006 to 2010.
Table 4.1 lists ﬁve countries with the highest Internet users and ﬁve countries with the
lowest Internet users per 100 population in descending order, based on 2010 World Bank
data. The table also lists the number of Internet users during 2003 and 1996 for those ten
countries.
Table 4.1: Internet Users in the World
World Internet Internet Internet
Rank Country Bank Users Users Users
Code 1996 2003 2010
Countries with highest Internet adoption, 2010
1. Iceland ISL 14.1 83.1 93.39
2. Norway NOR 18.25 78.13 93.39
3. Netherlands NLD 9.649 64.35 90.72
4. Luembourg LUX 5.552 54.55 90.62
5. Sweden SWE 9.004 79.13 90.00
Countries with lowest Internet adoption, 2010
5. Guinea GIN 0.002 0.451 1.000
4. Niger NER 0.001 0.156 0.830
3. Ethiopia ETH 0.002 0.106 0.750
2. Congo, Dem. Rep. COD 0.000 0.135 0.720
1. Sierra Leone SLE 0.003 0.190 0.580
Internet adoption is measured by the number of Internet users/100 population.
The data is collected from World Bank's World Development Indicators data-set.
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4.2 Bilateral Trade and the Internet
The Internet has become a crucial platform for trade between buyers and sellers located in
diﬀerent parts of the world (Meltzer, 2013). Several studies have found a trade promoting role
of the Internet. Most of the previous studies have analyzed the impact of Internet adoption
on the total volume of trade without diﬀerentiating agricultural goods from manufactured
commodities. Researchers also established the trade stimulating role of the Internet in the
service sector. Studies by Freund and Weinhold (2002, 2004); Clarke and Wallsten, (2006);
and Timmis (2012) suggest that the use of the Internet can stimulate trade. For example,
Freund and Weinhold (2002) found that the Internet adoption by the trading partner abroad
facilitates exports of services to the United States. Freund and Weinhold (2004) use a gravity
model to examine the eﬀect of the internet on trade among 56 countries. They found no
evidence of Internet eﬀect on total trade ﬂows in 1995 and only weak evidence of an eﬀect
in 1996. However, they found an increasing and signiﬁcant impact from 1997 to 1999. Their
results suggest that the impact of the internet on trade is stronger for poor countries than
for rich countries.
Clarke and Wallsten, (2006) found that access to the Internet improves export perfor-
mance in developing countries, but not in developed countries. They also found that this
direction of trade goes from developing countries with high Internet penetration to high-
income developed countries, but not towards developing countries with a lower degree of
Internet adoption.
Using a gravity model framework, Timmis (2012) examined the eﬀect of internet adoption
on trade for OECD countries for the period 1990-2010. The results suggest that the country
pairs with relatively higher Internet adoption rates trade more with each other as compared
to country pairs with lower adoption rates.
Fink et al. (2005) and Tang (2006) explored the role of communication costs in trade.
They used diﬀerent means of communication and found that adopting the Internet as a
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medium of communication helps in reducing trade costs and therefore increases the volume
of trade. In other words, they found a positive relationship between the Internet as a means
of communication and the trade performance of a country. Fink et al. (2005) further found
that, along with lowering the ﬁxed cost, the internet tends to reduce the variable cost of
trade and thereby augments the trade volume.
Rauch and Trindade (2003) also support the above-mentioned ﬁndings. They argue
that the Internet makes substitution among buyers or among sellers easier by providing
information quickly and promptly. They note that Improved information allows home ﬁrms
to rule out more potential foreign trade partners in advance of attempting to form a match
(Rauch and Trindade, 2003).
Compared to the existing literature analyzing the role of the Internet on manufactured
goods and services, literature showing a link between agricultural trade and the Internet
is rare. One exception is a study by Wheatly and Roe (2005) who examine the eﬀect of
the Internet on US bilateral trade for the years 1995 to 2003. Their work diﬀerentiates
between agricultural and horticultural commodities and examines the impact of Internet
penetration on trade. Their results suggest a negative relationship between the degree of
Internet penetration and trade costs. They also found this relationship to be more signiﬁcant
for imports rather than exports.
This study also seeks to determine the eﬀect of Internet penetration on agricultural
exports. The study diﬀers from Wheatly and Roe (2005) and supports the ﬁnding by Park
(2005). Park (2005) estimated the eﬀect of the Internet as a measure of telecommunication
on bilateral trade in agricultural and non-agricultural goods among the OECD countries
between 1997 to 2001. According to the ﬁndings of the study, improved telecommunication
had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on trade in non-agricultural commodities than in agricultural goods.
Similarly, this study argues that the eﬀect of the Internet as a medium of communication
on agricultural exports is limited; Whereas, the Internet is more capable of enhancing trade
in the non-agricultural sector. In this paper, the following is hypothesized:
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Hypothesis 1: The Internet as a medium of communication, is a more eﬃcient predictor
of trade in non-agricultural exports than in agricultural commodities.
Agriculture is considered to be a more important component in the developing economies
than in developed nations. Most of the developing countries are net exporters of agricultural
commodities. Yet, the agricultural sector in developing countries is discouraged not only by
agricultural protection policies in high-income countries but also by domestic policies favor-
ing manufacturing and service sectors (Hertel et al., 2000). The agricultural sector tends to
be neglected as an accelerator of growth because investment in the industry provides higher
economic stimulus. The agricultural sector also suﬀers from a lack of infrastructure that can
boost production and improve terms of trade. To come out of this trap, massive investment
and a minimum threshold level of technological infrastructure is necessary so that the agri-
cultural sector can integrate with non-agricultural industry and take advantage of available
technologies. Until that threshold level is reached, the trade promoting role of the Internet
will be restricted to developed sectors like manufacturing and services. However, once that
threshold level is reached, the Internet as a medium of communication can boost agricul-
tural exports by providing nations with the ability to gain competitive and comparative
advantages.
This paper uses an augmented gravity model to examine whether Internet penetration,
as measured by the number of Internet users per hundred population, can signiﬁcantly aﬀect
bilateral trade. To analyze the commodity speciﬁc impact of the Internet on bilateral trade,
the study is conducted separately on total agricultural and non-agricultural exports for the
years 2006 to 2010. To analyze the data, multiple regressions are used and results are tested
for robustness. To reduce omitted variable bias, a broad range of theoretically plausible
determinants of trade are also included in the model. Furthermore, Hekman's two-step
method and Heckman's selection model are used to correct for the sample-selection bias
present in the trade data. Also, to deal with the endogeneity issue the instrumental variable
approach is used. This paper contributes to the trade literature in two ways. Firstly,
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according to a review of the literature, this is the ﬁrst systematic cross-country empirical
analysis that relates the Internet to agricultural exports. Secondly, the paper proposes a
novel instrument to deal with the issue of endogeneity.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
In order to assess the relationship between internet penetration and international trade,
this paper adopts the gravity model technique. The gravity model, pioneered by Tinbergen
(1962), is an essential tool for measuring the size and impact of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers
on bilateral trade. In its original form the gravity model is expressed by the following:
Yei = G
(MeMi)
Dei
(4.1)
A standard gravity model assumes that the volume of trade between two countries is
positively related to the size of the economies and inversely related to the trade costs. Here,
Yij measures the volume of trade between country e and i, Me and Mi represents the size of
economies. D is the geographical distance between the countries, capturing trade costs. G
is the gravitational constant.
In the augmented gravity model adopted to analyze the relationship between Internet
penetration and the volume of exports, GDP is included to capture the market size of the
economy. Population is also included as a measure of country size. Geographical distance
between the countries captures trade costs. To capture trade factors, a number of additional
dummy variables, such as island economy, landlocked economy, common language, the com-
mon border, colonial heritage, income level or geographical region, are included in the model.
For the gravity model, Internet penetration measured by number of Internet users per 100
population, is included as a main variable of interest. To reduce the omitted variable bias,
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this model controls for other variables that can facilitate trade. Since bilateral trade in-
volves two countries, the quality of extent of Internet penetration in both the countries can
aﬀect the volume of trade. Therefore, a variable measuring the number of internet users in
the partner country is also included in the model. The augmented gravity model includes
variables such as the bilateral tariﬀ rate and the exchange rate, that have the potential to
inﬂuence the volume of agricultural trade. The model also controls for the average trade-cost
incurred by exporters and importers in each country.
The log-linearized augmented gravity model is given by the following equation:
log(Export)eit = α + β1 log(Internet)et + β2 log(Internet)it + γ1 log(GDP )et
+ γ2 log(GDP )it + γ3 log(Population)et + γ4 log(Population)it
+ γ5 log(Distance)ei + γ6Landlockede + γ7Languageei + γ8Colonyei
+ γ9Borderei + γ10Islande + γ11Incomee + γ12Regione
+ γ13 log(ExchangeRate)et + γ14 log(Tariff)iet + γ15 log(ExportC)eit
+ γ16 log(ImportC)iet + δei + eit (4.2)
Here, e and i represents the exporting and importing countries respectively, and t denotes
time. Exporteit denotes volume of agricultural export from country e to country i at time
period t. Internetet and Internetit gives the number of Internet users per 100 population in
country e and i, respectively, at period t. GDPet and GDPit are the real GDP of country
e and i respectively at time period t. Populationet and Populationit denote population of
country e and i, respectively, at time period t. Distanceei gives the distance between the
capital cities of country e and i. Land is a binary dummy variable that takes a value of unity
if country e is landlocked. Languageei is a binary dummy variable which is unity if country
e and country i have a common language and zero otherwise. Colonyei is a binary dummy
which is unity if e and i had the same colonizer. Borderei is a binary dummy variable which
is unity if e and i share a common border. Islande is a binary dummy taking a value of unity
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if country e is an island economy. Incomee represents the set of dummies representing the
income group to which country e belongs. Regione represents the set of dummies representing
the geographical region to which country e belongs. Tariffiet is a weighted average tariﬀ
applied by country i on country e's exports at period t. ExchangeRateet represents the real
exchange rate of country e quoted in US dollars. ExportC gives the trade-cost associated
with exporting a commodity from country e to country i at period t. Similarly, ImportC
gives the trade-cost associated with importing a commodity from country e to country i at
period t. δei is a set of time ﬁxed eﬀects. eit is the error term that is assumed to be normally
distributed with mean zero.
The model is estimated using three-year panel data from 2006 to 2010. GDP is used as a
proxy for the size of the economy. The larger the size of the economy, the higher will be the
volume of agricultural trade between country pairs. Therefore, the coeﬃcient of log(GDP ) is
expected to be positive. The coeﬃcient for the log value of distance, which is used as a proxy
for trade cost is expected to be negative as higher distance increases the trade cost, thereby
reducing the volume of trade between the countries. As transportation costs are higher for
islands or landlocked economies compared to the countries sharing a common border, the
volume of trade is expected to be higher in the last case than in the other two instances.
It is also assumed that the volume of trade will be higher between the countries sharing
similar cultural or colonial heritage. The same goes for the country pairs belonging to the
same income group or the same geographical region. Again, the higher the population of the
countries, the higher will be the demand for the commodities. As a result, the coeﬃcient
of log(population) of the importing country is expected to have a positive sign. The same
will be true for the coeﬃcient of log(population) of the exporting country. As complex tariﬀ
barriers discourage trade, the coeﬃcient of the tariﬀ parameter is expected to take a negative
sign. The coeﬃcient of the exchange rate is also expected to take a negative sign. A Higher
value of this variable implies the value of the exporting country's currency appreciates in
terms of the US dollar. With an appreciation of exporting country's currency, the price of
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its exports increases, which decreases the volume of exports. Both the coeﬃcients of export
and import costs are expected to take a negative size as higher cost should inversely aﬀect
the volume of trade.
In this paper, initially the log-linearized augmented gravity model is analyzed using the
benchmark Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. Panel estimation methods like population
averaged Feasible Generalized Least Square (Pooled FGLS), and Random Eﬀect models
are also used to study the relationship between the Internet and bilateral trade. Sample
selection bias is corrected using Heckman's two-step model and Heckman's selection model.
To alleviate potential endogeneity present in the data, instrumental variable analysis is
conducted.
4.3.1 Sample-selection Bias
In trade data, missing trade values are common as zero trade ﬂows may result from a
country's decision not to trade with another economy. The missing trade value creates a
problem when the log-linearized augmented gravity model is estimated using OLS. As the
log of zero is undeﬁned, zero trade ﬂows will be automatically dropped from the equation,
giving rise to sample-selection bias.2
To deal with the problem of sample-selection bias, this study follows Heckman's two-step
procedure to reduce the bias (Heckman, 1979). In the ﬁrst stage, a Probit Model (Selection
equation) is estimated to determine the probability of a country engaging in trade. In
the second stage, the expected values of the trade ﬂow from the ﬁrst stage, conditional on
whether country pairs are trading (Outcome equation), are estimated using ordinary least
squares. For identiﬁcation of the second-stage trade-ﬂow equation, an identiﬁcation variable
is required. For the validity of this identiﬁcation variable two conditions must be satisﬁed:
2Alternative approaches to handle the presence of zero trade includes: i) Truncating the sample by
discarding the observations with zero trade values; and ii) Adding a small constant to each observation on
the dependent variable before taking logarithms. This method works properly if the zeros are randomly
distributed. Otherwise, this method gives rise to sample selection bias.
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i) This variable should hold the property that it inﬂuences a country's propensity to engage
in trade; and ii) This variable should not have any direct eﬀect on the volume of trade.
Previous literature suggests that variables like common religion, common border, common
language, etc., satisfy this condition (Helpman et al., 2006).
Another way to deal with the sample-selection bias is to use Heckman's selection model
where the selection and the outcome equations are estimated simultaneously using Maximum
Likelihood Estimation. Heckman's selection model depends strongly on the model being
correctly speciﬁed. Heckman's selection model can produce biased estimates if the model
is not properly speciﬁed or if a speciﬁc data-set violates the model's assumptions. When
the underlying goal is to predict an actual response, Hekman's two-step model is preferred.
If the goal is to predict the value of the dependent variable that would be observed in the
absence of selection, however, Heckman's selection model is more appropriate.
4.3.2 Endogeneity
The cross-country correlation suggests a possible causal relationship between the internet
penetration and the volume of export. Access to the Internet and the volume of export might
be determined simultaneously. Several recent studies have suggested that trade stimulates
internet use. Economists suggest that countries with greater contact with the outside world,
either via trade, tourism or because of geographical location, are more likely to be developed
with respect to digital technology than other countries (Onyeiwu, 2002). Internet access
might also inﬂuence export behavior. If access to the Internet makes it economical for
buyers and sellers to come together then, everything else being constant, exports could be
higher in countries with greater internet penetration. The internet penetration can also be
endogenous because of the possibility of omitted variable bias. It is well known that, in
the presence of endogeneity, OLS estimation will give biased estimates as the orthogonality
assumption of OLS will be violated.
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To reduce potential endogeneity, the study adopts instrumental variable (IV) regression.
A newly constructed variable on historical, technological adoption from the Cross-country
Historical Adoption of Technology or CHAT data-set (Comin and Hobijn; 2009) is used as
an instrument for technology adoption today (Internet penetration). Comin et al. (2010)
compute indices for technology adoption prior to the era of colonization and extensive Euro-
pean contacts. They compute indices for technology adoption in 1000 BC, 0 AD, and 1500
AD and found that there is a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between the technology
adoption indices in 1500 AD and technology adoption today. This relationship was found to
be robust at the sector level even after controlling for geographical and institutional factors.
Also, there was a considerable degree of cross-country variation in technology adoption in
1500 AD. They note 1500 AD data to be more precise as there were a large number of
sources documenting the technology adoption patterns during that period. This measure of
historical, technological adoption was computed in ﬁve diﬀerent sectors, namely agriculture,
transportation, military, industry and communication. In our model, we include technol-
ogy adoption in communication in 1500 AD as an instrument for the modern day mode of
communication (Internet penetration). To satisfy the condition for a valid instrument, com-
munication adoption in 1500AD should be correlated with the potential endogenous variable
internet penetration, but should not aﬀect the volume of agricultural and non-agricultural
exports directly.
In this paper, conventional Two-stage Least Square (2SLS) and Generalized Methods of
Moment (GMM) techniques are used for IV analysis.
4.4 Data
Bilateral trade ﬂow data for agricultural and non-agricultural commodities are collected from
the Commodity and Trade Database (COMTRADE) of the United Nations Statistics Divi-
sion for 2003 to 2005. Agricultural goods (Food and live animals) are deﬁned as commodities
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in Category 0 at the one-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC
Revision 1). Non-agricultural goods (Machinery and transport equipment) are deﬁned as
commodities in Category 7 at the one-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classi-
ﬁcation (SITC Revision 1). Table 4.2 and 4.3 summarizes the relevant variables used in this
paper.
Table 4.2: The Internet & Agricultural Exports: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
log(Export)ei 13.98 3.138 61595
log(Internet)e 3.198 1.171 62726
log(Internet)i 2.913 1.384 61729
log(GDP)e 25.55 2.072 61752
log(GDP)i 24.82 2.345 60667
log(Distance)ei 3.691 0.392 56777
log(Population)e 16.62 1.747 62292
log(Population)i 16.07 1.964 61890
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 4.589 0.076 39172
log(Tariﬀ)ie 2.097 1.294 29365
log(Export Cost)ei 6.880 0.424 61563
log(Import Cost)ie 7.088 0.51 58680
1500 Technology Adoption Index_e 0.534 0.414 47552
1500 Technology Adoption Index_i 0.502 0.407 41667
Summary statistics are presented together for the years 2006 to 2010.
Data for the main variable of interest comes from the World Development Indicators
database available on the World Bank website. This variable determines the number of
internet users per 1000 people and is used as a proxy for Internet penetration. Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is used as a measure of country size. The data for real GDP (in constant
US dollars) has been taken from the World Development Indicators published by the World
Bank. Population data also comes from the World Bank data-set.
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A weighted average of applied tariﬀ rates weighted by the values of bilateral agricultural
trade is used in this paper. The tariﬀ data were derived from the Trade Analysis and
Information System (TRAINS) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). Real exchange rate data expressed in local currency units relative to the US
dollar, comes from the World Bank. The data on `cost to export' and `cost to import' comes
from the Doing Business" database constructed by the World Bank. Gravity model variables
such as distance, common language, common border, colonial pasts, etc that captures the
variation in trade costs between country pairs are collected from the UNCTAD database.
Table 4.3: The Internet & Non-agricultural Exports: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
log(Export)ei 13.93 3.801 71824
log(Internet)e 3.302 1.151 72878
log(Internet)i 2.804 1.431 70743
log(GDP)e 25.58 2.022 71851
log(GDP)i 24.64 2.373 70089
log(Distance)ei 3.700 0.380 64945
log(Population)e 16.47 1.778 72381
log(Population)i 16.01 1.999 71600
log(Tariﬀ)ie 1.308 1.277 49715
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 4.590 0.077 46468
log(Export Cost)ei 6.889 0.428 71047
log(Import Cost)ie 7.121 0.530 67752
1500 Technology Adoption Index_e 0.578 0.413 52133
1500 Technology Adoption Index_i 0.471 0.403 48458
Summary statistics are presented together for the years 2006 to 2010.
The data source for the instrument is Comin et al. (2010). As previously mentioned,
a number of historical information sources are used to compute an index of cross-country
technology adoption in 1000 BC, 0 AD, and 1500 AD. Technology adoption in 1500 AD was
found to be an accurate predictor of technology adoption today. This measure of historical
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technological adoption was computed in ﬁve diﬀerent sectors, namely agriculture, trans-
portation, military, industry, and communication. In this paper, the technology adoption in
communication is used as an instrument for Internet penetration. The communication index
is constructed using four variables: the use of movable block printing, the use of woodblock
printing, the use of books, and the use of paper and takes a value between 0 and 1. A
value closer to zero implies a lower degree of technology adoption in 1500 AD and a value
closer to one suggests that the degree of technology adoption was high during 1500 AD for
a particular country.
4.5 Results
This section presents the estimation results of the empirical model given by equation 4.1.
The regressions are based on an unbalanced panel data set for a broad set of countries during
the period 2006 to 2010. While estimating, the 1% tails of log value of agricultural and non-
agricultural exports across countries were trimmed. That is, all countries were pooled and
the top and bottom 1% of log value of bilateral exports in each of the pools were trimmed.
Column 1 and 2 in each table presents the results for agricultural commodities. The last two
columns provides the results for non-agricultural products. Each column includes standard
gravity model variables along with internet penetration as main explanatory variable. The
model also controls for a number of variables to minimize the omitted variable bias. Region
and income dummies are included in the model to rule out the possibility that these results
are driven by the omission of region and income ﬁxed factors. Also time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects
were added to the model to account for all sources of unobserved heterogeneity that are
constant for a given year across all countries. To deal with this issue of heteroscedasticity,
robust clustered standard errors are used. Standard errors are clustered by distance, which
is unique to each country pair but is identical for both trading partners.
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4.5.1 Conventional Panel Data Techniques
As a benchmark, initially the gravity model is estimated using the Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) Method. Consistency of OLS requires that the error term to be uncorrelated with
the explanatory variables. Therefore, Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS) is consistent in
the Random Eﬀect (RE) model but is inconsistent in the Fixed Eﬀect (FE) model. In this
paper, due to the presence of time-invariant factors, the RE model is more appropriate than
the FE model. Thus, the estimates from the POLS model are assumed to be consistent in
this study.
The results from POLS model are presented in Table 4.4. From the ﬁrst two columns of
Table 4.4, we can see that there is no eﬀect of the Internet on agricultural exports. However
for non-agricultural exports, the coeﬃcient of Internet penetration in the exporting country
is highly signiﬁcant and takes the expected positive sign. The results suggest that a higher
degree of Internet penetration in the the exporting country will increase the volume of non-
agricultural exports. For example, in column 4, the coeﬃcient of Internet penetration in
the exporting country suggests that a 1% improvement in e-governance measures in the
exporting country will increase the volume of non-agricultural exports by almost 0.39%.
However, in all the speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcient of the Internet penetration in the importing
country remains insigniﬁcant with a negative sign for both agricultural and non-agricultural
goods. The standard gravity model variables also take the expected sign, and the results are
statistically signiﬁcant in almost all the cases.
The results from The Pooled Feasible Generalized Least Square (PFGLS) model are
presented in Table 4.5. PFGLS estimation leads to estimators of the parameters of the pooled
model that are more eﬃcient than POLS estimation in the presence of heteroscedasticity and
auto-correlation. The model works well for an inﬁnite sample. Under the assumption that
any individual-level unobserved eﬀects are uncorrelated with regressors, PFGLS is consistent.
Here, the estimates from the PFGLS model are similar to the estimates from POLS model.
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Table 4.4: The Internet & Bilateral Exports: Pooled OLS
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (A1) (A2) (N1) (N2)
log(Internet)e 0.142 0.189 0.325*** 0.392***
(0.096) (0.107) (0.077) (0.08)
log(Internet)i -0.054 -0.039 -0.061 -0.034
(0.046) (0.048) (0.033) (0.035)
log(GDP)e 0.663*** 0.646*** 1.622*** 1.599***
(0.070) (0.075) (0.051) (0.055)
log(GDP)i 0.665*** 0.659*** 0.839*** 0.827***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.031) (0.032)
log(Distance)ei -2.759*** -2.767*** -2.937*** -2.938***
(0.115) (0.115) (0.101) (0.101)
Common Colony_ei 0.446 0.450 0.278 0.264
(0.525) (0.528) (0.277) (0.277)
Island Economy_e -0.549*** -0.561*** -0.817*** -0.836***
(0.108) (0.109) (0.079) (0.079)
Landlocked Economy_e -0.865*** -0.867*** 0.731*** 0.727***
(0.118) (0.119) (0.080) (0.081)
Common Language_ei 1.008*** 1.011*** 1.308*** 1.310***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.097) (0.097)
Common Border_ei 0.951*** 0.951*** 1.379*** 1.386***
(0.243) (0.243) (0.260) (0.260)
log(Population)e -0.151* -0.134 -0.294*** -0.273***
(0.076) (0.079) (0.053) (0.056)
log(Population)i -0.013 -0.006 0.033 0.046
(0.045) (0.046) (0.031) (0.032)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 1.766*** 1.939*** 0.355 0.635*
(0.374) (0.381) (0.268) (0.272)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.107*** -0.108*** 0.001 0.003
(0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022)
log(Export Cost)ei 0.382** 0.405** -1.487*** -1.447***
(0.120) (0.127) (0.084) (0.089)
log(Import Cost)ie -0.580*** -0.565*** -0.441*** -0.415***
(0.066) (0.068) (0.048) (0.049)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No Yes No Yes
Observations 13628 13628 21155 21155
Adjusted R2 0.407 0.408 0.685 0.687
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Column 1 & 2 presents the results for agricultural commodities. Column 3 & 4 provides the results
for non-agricultural products. Each column includes standard gravity model variables along with
internet penetration as main explanatory variable. Constant not reported.
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Table 4.5: The Internet & Bilateral Exports: Pooled FGLS
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (A1) (A2) (N1) (N2)
log(Internet)e 0.139* 0.108 0.165** 0.253***
(0.066) (0.074) (0.058) (0.063)
log(Internet)i -0.070 -0.092* -0.037 0.024
(0.039) (0.043) (0.030) (0.033)
log(GDP)e 0.621*** 0.592*** 1.483*** 1.515***
(0.063) (0.067) (0.046) (0.049)
log(GDP)i 0.713*** 0.705*** 0.785*** 0.781***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.031) (0.032)
log(Distance)ei -2.675*** -2.652*** -2.689*** -2.719***
(0.133) (0.134) (0.104) (0.105)
Common Colony_ei 0.517 0.540 0.178 0.121
(0.441) (0.436) (0.278) (0.277)
Island Economy_e -0.283* -0.287* -1.021*** -1.027***
(0.130) (0.130) (0.091) (0.092)
Landlocked Economy_e -0.774*** -0.810*** 0.268** 0.308***
(0.136) (0.137) (0.090) (0.092)
Common Language_ei 1.032*** 1.016*** 1.166*** 1.210***
(0.127) (0.127) (0.108) (0.109)
Common Border_ei 0.704** 0.680** 1.320*** 1.373***
(0.251) (0.250) (0.271) (0.275)
log(Population)e -0.104 -0.085 -0.212*** -0.226***
(0.067) (0.071) (0.047) (0.049)
log(Population)i -0.062 -0.058 0.087** 0.099**
(0.045) (0.046) (0.032) (0.032)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -0.161 -0.239 -1.295*** -1.141***
(0.206) (0.206) (0.171) (0.174)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.113*** -0.114*** -0.035* -0.034*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017)
log(Export Cost)ei 0.212* 0.260* -0.617*** -0.658***
(0.091) (0.101) (0.085) (0.099)
log(Import Cost)ie -0.220*** -0.232*** -0.410*** -0.367***
(0.057) (0.060) (0.045) (0.046)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No Yes No Yes
Observations 8931 8931 16520 16520
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Column 1 & 2 presents the results for agricultural commodities. Column 3 & 4 provides the results
for non-agricultural products. Each column includes standard gravity model variables along with
internet penetration as main explanatory variable. Constant not reported.
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The result presented in column 4 suggests that a 1% increase in internet penetration in
the exporting country will increase the volume of non-agricultural exports by almost 0.39%.
For agricultural commodities the impact of internet penetration becomes insigniﬁcant after
controlling for year ﬁxed eﬀects. Also, the impact of importing country's Internet adoption
remains insigniﬁcant for both the commodity groups. The standard gravity model variables
also take the expected sign, and the results are statistically signiﬁcant in almost all the cases.
4.5.2 Heckman Model Estimates
This section presents the results after correcting for sample selection bias using Heckms's
procedures. Results from the ﬁrst-step Heckman procedure is included in the appendix. The
result shows the identiﬁcation variable, the probability that two randomly drawn people
from a country pair speak in the same language, to be an important determining factor for
the country pairs to engage in trade. Econometrically, this provides the necessary exclusion
restriction for identiﬁcation of the second stage trade ﬂow equation. Therefore the variable
Common Language" is used as an exclusion variable in the construction of the Inverse Mills
Ratio for the second stage Heckman procedure.
Table 4.6 shows the second-stage results from Heckman's Two-step model. The model
shows a negative relationship between Internet penetration and the volume of exports. The
ﬁndings are similar for both agricultural and non-agricultural commodities.
Table 4.7 presents the results from Heckman's selection model. The results from this
model suggest that, once the sample-selection bias is corrected, a higher degree of internet
penetration in the exporting country will increase the volume of exports. The results are
highly signiﬁcant for both commodity groups. The results further suggest that the degree of
internet penetration in the importing country will also positively inﬂuence agricultural and
non-agricultural exports.
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Table 4.6: The Internet & Bilateral Exports: Heckman's Two-step Model.
Second-step Estimates
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (A1) (A2) (N1) (N2)
log(Internet)e -0.444* -0.603** -0.108 -0.017
(0.183) (0.208) (0.121) (0.129)
log(Internet)i -0.149 -0.211 -0.227** -0.189*
(0.147) (0.156) (0.073) (0.076)
log(GDP)e 1.396*** 1.499*** 1.617*** 1.573***
(0.172) (0.180) (0.089) (0.092)
log(GDP)i 0.794*** 0.837*** 1.017*** 0.996***
(0.126) (0.130) (0.063) (0.064)
log(Distance)ei -2.579*** -2.572*** -3.185*** -3.215***
(0.399) (0.402) (0.179) (0.179)
Common Colony_ei 2.564*** 2.517*** 34.76*** 34.67***
(0.424) (0.423) (9.003) (8.997)
Island Economy_e -1.021** -1.023** 6.720*** 6.703***
(0.339) (0.343) (1.825) (1.823)
Landlocked Economy_e 0.821 0.920* 1.758* 1.713*
(0.422) (0.424) (0.710) (0.711)
Common Border_ei 1.353** 1.349** 30.67*** 30.58***
(0.416) (0.414) (7.558) (7.552)
log(Population)e -1.066*** -1.160*** -0.441*** -0.404***
(0.188) (0.195) (0.097) (0.099)
log(Population)i -0.113 -0.160 -0.181** -0.161*
(0.131) (0.135) (0.065) (0.066)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 2.404** 2.186** -0.377 -0.190
(0.788) (0.804) (0.602) (0.599)
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.129 0.138 0.187*** 0.190***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.042) (0.042)
log(Export Cost)ei -0.788** -0.934** -0.372* -0.286
(0.305) (0.317) (0.167) (0.172)
log(Import Cost)ie -0.557** -0.622** -0.287** -0.258**
(0.200) (0.205) (0.096) (0.096)
Inverse Mills Ratio 36.99*** 36.90***
-9.627 -9.619
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No Yes No Yes
Observations 1807 1807 2573 2573
Adjusted R2 0.433 0.435 0.652 0.653
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Col-
umn 1 & 2 presents the results for agricultural commodities. Column 3 & 4 provides the results for
non-agricultural products. Each column includes standard gravity model variables along with inter-
net penetration as main explanatory variable. Constant not reported.
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Table 4.7: The Internet & Bilateral Exports: Heckman's Selection Model
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (A1) (A2) (N1) (N2)
log(Internet)e 0.338*** 0.338*** 1.453*** 1.453***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.039) (0.039)
log(Internet)i 0.495*** 0.495*** 0.419*** 0.419***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
log(GDP)e -0.306*** -0.315*** -0.578*** -0.548***
(0.086) (0.093) (0.079) (0.083)
log(GDP)i -0.394*** -0.400*** -0.317*** -0.297***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.042) (0.043)
log(Distance)ei 0.756*** 0.761*** 0.681*** 0.687***
(0.178) (0.177) (0.105) (0.104)
Common Colony_ei -0.041 -0.040 0.150 0.191
(0.290) (0.292) (0.242) (0.267)
Island Economy_e -0.022 -0.023 -0.183* -0.167*
(0.126) (0.126) (0.083) (0.084)
Landlocked Economy_e -0.164 -0.171 -0.793*** -0.787***
(0.149) (0.151) (0.112) (0.112)
Common Language_ei -0.455** -0.458** -0.080 -0.071
(0.146) (0.147) (0.150) (0.157)
Common Border_ei -0.479* -0.479* -0.292 -0.293
(0.221) (0.220) (0.168) (0.164)
log(Population)e -0.040 -0.033 0.092 0.059
(0.074) (0.081) (0.076) (0.081)
log(Population)i 0.053 0.059 -0.050 -0.071
(0.063) (0.064) (0.043) (0.044)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -0.997* -1.012* -1.065*** -1.128***
(0.405) (0.404) (0.305) (0.276)
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.010
(0.037) (0.037) (0.023) (0.023)
log(Export Cost)ei -0.001 0.013 0.729*** 0.686***
(0.119) (0.127) (0.102) (0.103)
log(Import Cost)ie -0.068 -0.064 0.207*** 0.179**
(0.088) (0.093) (0.063) (0.065)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No Yes No Yes
Rho 0.718 0.719 0.893 0.898
Inverse Mills Ratio 2.002 2.006 2.884 2.903
Observations 14285 14285 22095 22095
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Column 1 & 2 presents the results for agricultural commodities. Column 3 & 4 provides the results
for non-agricultural products. Each column includes standard gravity model variables along with
internet penetration as main explanatory variable. Constant not reported.
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For example, from column 2, we can see that a 1% increase in the degree of Internet
penetration in the exporting country will increase the volume of agricultural exports by
almost 0.33%. At the same time, a 1% increase in the degree of Internet penetration in
the importing country will increase the volume of agricultural exports by almost 0.5%. For
non-agricultural exports, a 1% increase in the degree of Internet penetration in the exporting
country will increase the volume of exports by almost 1.4%. Similarly, a 1% increase in the
degree of Internet penetration in the importing country will increase the volume of non-
agricultural exports by almost 0.5%. Therefore, the results suggest that a higher degree of
internet adoption will be more eﬀective for non-agricultural exports than agricultural goods.
4.5.3 IV Estimates
Table 4.8 reports the results from 2SLS analysis using the 1500 communication technology
as an instrument for technology adoption (Internet penetration) today. For agricultural
commodities, after controlling for year ﬁxed eﬀects, the coeﬃcient for internet penetration
in the exporting country appears with the expected positive sign. The result is also highly
signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of internet penetration in the importing country still remains
insigniﬁcant and takes a negative sign. However, the F-statistic presented at the bottom
of Table 4.9 suggests the instrument to be weak. For non-agricultural commodities, the
coeﬃcient for internet penetration in the exporting country becomes insigniﬁcant after con-
trolling for year ﬁxed eﬀects. However, the coeﬃcient of internet penetration in the importing
country becomes highly signiﬁcant and takes a positive sign. Furthermore, the F-statistic
presented in column 4, suggests that the instrument is strong (F-statistics = 10.418 > 10)
i.e. communication technology in 1500 AD is a signiﬁcant predictor of technology adoption
(Internet penetration) today. Table 4.9 reports the results from GMM analysis. The point
estimates obtained from using GMM are very similar to the 2SLS estimates.
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Table 4.8: The Internet & Bilateral Exports: IV Analysis (2SLS)
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (A1) (A2) (N1) (N2)
log(Internet)e 22.77 16.98*** 8.829* -1.448
(12.67) (4.085) (4.075) (2.455)
log(Internet)i -7.405 -2.792 12.18*** 15.10***
(4.557) (6.577) (2.628) (3.413)
log(GDP)e -12.62 -9.148*** -3.571 2.561
(7.493) (2.398) (2.411) (1.424)
log(GDP)i 6.419 2.982 -8.633*** -10.68***
(3.620) (5.059) (2.037) (2.597)
log(Distance)ei -3.760*** -3.581*** -3.257*** -2.523***
(0.947) (0.507) (0.384) (0.342)
Common Colony_ei 0.548 0.758 3.163*** 2.689***
(2.449) (2.133) (0.842) (0.640)
Island Economy_e 0.385 -0.423 0.891 -1.125***
(1.349) (0.415) (0.599) (0.317)
Landlocked Economy_e -4.222* -3.816*** -0.573 0.987
(1.962) (0.949) (0.894) (0.726)
Common Language_ei 1.825 1.252 -1.030 -1.242
(1.020) (1.128) (0.626) (0.696)
Common Border_ei 1.148 1.043 1.234* 1.045*
(1.155) (0.846) (0.560) (0.509)
log(Population)e 12.96 9.474*** 4.715* -1.279
(7.451) (2.344) (2.317) (1.360)
log(Population)i -5.266 -2.092 8.538*** 10.39***
(3.309) (4.647) (1.828) (2.335)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -3.18 1.322 -7.804** 4.307**
(5.992) (1.364) (2.776) (1.312)
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.324 0.041 0.071 -0.148
(0.278) (0.368) (0.078) (0.083)
log(Export Cost)ei 5.822* 5.561*** -1.422 -1.309
(2.477) (1.467) (0.806) (0.890)
log(Import Cost)ie -4.430** -1.770 4.127*** 6.550***
(1.676) (2.920) (1.004) (1.580)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No Yes No Yes
Observations 9074 9074 13765 13765
Wald F-statistics 6.466 3.261 9.411 10.418
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Column 1 & 2 presents the results for agricultural commodities. Column 3 & 4 provides the results
for non-agricultural products. Each column includes standard gravity model variables along with
internet penetration as main explanatory variable. Constant not reported.
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Table 4.9: The Internet & Bilateral Exports: IV Analysis (GMM)
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (A1) (A2) (N1) (N2)
log(Internet)e 22.77 16.98*** 8.829* -1.448
(12.67) (4.085) (4.075) (2.455)
log(Internet)i -7.405 -2.792 12.18*** 15.10***
(4.557) (6.577) (2.628) (3.413)
log(GDP)e -12.62 -9.148*** -3.571 2.561
(7.493) (2.398) (2.411) (1.424)
log(GDP)i 6.419 2.982 -8.633*** -10.68***
(3.620) (5.059) (2.037) (2.597)
log(Distance)ei -3.760*** -3.581*** -3.257*** -2.523***
(0.947) (0.507) (0.384) (0.342)
Common Colony_ei 0.548 0.758 3.163*** 2.689***
(2.449) (2.133) (0.842) (0.640)
Island Economy_e 0.385 -0.423 0.891 -1.125***
(1.349) (0.415) (0.599) (0.317)
Landlocked Economy_e -4.222* -3.816*** -0.573 0.987
(1.962) (0.949) (0.894) (0.726)
Common Language_ei 1.825 1.252 -1.030 -1.242
(1.020) (1.128) (0.626) (0.696)
Common Border_ei 1.148 1.043 1.234* 1.045*
(1.155) (0.846) (0.560) (0.509)
log(Population)e 12.96 9.474*** 4.715* -1.279
(7.451) (2.344) (2.317) (1.360)
log(Population)i -5.266 -2.092 8.538*** 10.39***
(3.309) (4.647) (1.828) (2.335)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -3.18 1.322 -7.804** 4.307**
(5.992) (1.364) (2.776) (1.312)
log(Tariﬀ)ie 0.324 0.0412 0.0711 -0.148
(0.278) (0.368) (0.078) (0.083)
log(Export Cost)ei 5.822* 5.561*** -1.422 -1.309
(2.477) (1.467) (0.806) (0.890)
log(Import Cost)ie -4.430** -1.770 4.127*** 6.550***
(1.676) (2.920) (1.004) (1.580)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No Yes No Yes
Observations 9074 9074 13765 13765
Wald F-statistics 6.466 3.261 9.411 10.418
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Column 1 & 2 presents the results for agricultural commodities. Column 3 & 4 provides the results
for non-agricultural products. Each column includes standard gravity model variables along with
internet penetration as main explanatory variable. Constant not reported.
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4.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to quantify the potential eﬀect of Internet adoption on export
performance. In this study, an augmented gravity model was used and diﬀerent estimation
techniques were combined to empirically investigate the eﬀects of the Internet on the volume
of trade. Separate analyses were done on trade related to agricultural commodities and non-
agricultural goods. The sample-selection bias present in the trade data was corrected using
Heckman's procedures. Instrumental Variable analysis was also done to reduce endogeneity.
According to the ﬁndings of the study, the trade promoting role of the Internet was more
prominent for non-agricultural commodities. The study found weak evidence of a trade-
stimulating eﬀect of the Internet on agricultural exports. If we compare these results with
the ﬁndings from Chapter 2, we can conclude that the eﬀect of the Internet as a medium
of communication is very limited. However, if the Internet is used as a platform to improve
e-governance, it shows more potential in improving the terms of trade.
For trade and institutional reforms, this study gives quite important results. The Internet
helps integrate the global economy by allowing the cross-border ﬂow of ideas, knowledge,
expertise, and innovations. It provides a relatively cost-eﬀective method for communications
for buyers and sellers residing in diﬀerent parts of the world. However, according to the
ﬁndings of this study, if the Internet is only used as a medium of communication, the trade
beneﬁts from Internet access is relatively modest both for agricultural and non-agricultural
commodities. This is true because the reduction in communication cost is a comparatively
smaller portion of the total trade cost, especially for agricultural trade. At the same time,
most of the developing countries suﬀer from a lack of infrastructure that can boost production
and improve terms of trade. The situation is even more serious in the agricultural sector
than the manufacturing and service sectors. Regarding access to Internet infrastructure such
as servers, networks, and computers there is also a huge disparity between developed and
developing nations. Moreover, in developing nations a larger proportion of the population
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lacks the skills necessary to use the Internet. To eliminate this alleged digital divide"
massive investment in physical and human capital should be central to the economic growth
policies of the government. Furthermore, if used as a platform to reach global markets and
to overcome some of the domestic impediments related to poor infrastructure and ineﬃcient
customs procedures, the Internet has the potential to produce substantial gains from trade.
Therefore, building Internet infrastructure and adopting information and communication
technology (ICT) for trimming down unnecessary trade impediments, should also be the
priority for the policymakers.
One limitation of this study was the lack of cross-country data on one of the most
important determinants of Internet penetration: the cost of using the Internet". Better
availability of this type of data would improve future analyses on this topic.
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Chapter 5. Summary and Conclusion
Trade facilitation is deﬁned as a measure that makes trade across the border easier. It is a tool
that simpliﬁes customs procedures, eliminates administrative delays, increases transparency,
and improves security by incorporating new technologies in trade (Zaki, 2015). This journal-
article style dissertation evaluates the eﬀect of diﬀerent aspects of trade facilitation that can
considerably inﬂuence the transit time between the origin and the destination. In doing so,
this study adopts the gravity model technique that has been an elemental tool for determining
the size and impact of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers to trade. Three topics related to trade
facilitation are addressed here in this dissertation.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, the relationship between e-governance and
agricultural exports are examined. This is the ﬁrst cross-country study in trade literature
that examines the eﬀect of e-governance on bilateral agricultural trade. The paper also
proposes a novel instrument to deal with the issue of endogeneity. The results suggest that
the quality of e-governance has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the volume of agricultural
exports. The eﬀect is much more signiﬁcant for the quality of e-governance in the exporting
country than in the importing country. The results are robust to a variety of estimation
techniques.
The third chapter quantiﬁes the eﬀect of corruption on bilateral agricultural exports.
This is the ﬁrst cross-country study that establishes a relationship between agricultural
commodities and the level of corruption prevailing in a country. The study found a trade-
taxing extortion eﬀect of corruption which suggests that the higher level of corruption will
reduce the volume of agricultural exports. The study found evidence of a trade enhancing
evasion eﬀect. A trade-enhancing evasion eﬀect suggests that corruption can boost trade
when the amount of the tariﬀ rises above a certain threshold level. The eﬀects were much
more prominent for the degree of corruption in the exporting country than for the importing
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country. The empirical estimates are robust to diﬀerent model speciﬁcation and the use of
various corruption indices.
The fourth chapter of the dissertation examines the role of the Internet on international
trade. In this paper, separate analyses were conducted to assess the impact of Internet
penetration on non-agricultural commodities. The paper also proposed a novel instrument to
correct for the problem of endogeneity. The study found weak evidence of a trade-stimulating
eﬀect of the Internet on agricultural exports. However, the results were comparatively more
signiﬁcant for non-agricultural commodities.
Overall this dissertation lends support to the existing literature that suggests trade fa-
cilitation can simplify and harmonize trade procedures and help in reducing the transaction
costs associated with the enforcement, regulation and administration of trade policies. The
main ﬁndings of this dissertation show that e-governance and corruption can signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the volume of exports. However, the study found the direct eﬀect of the Internet as
a medium of communication to be limited. From a policy point of view, these ﬁndings are
quite important. Firstly, unlike tariﬀ reductions that result in the loss of tariﬀ revenues,
eliminating non-tariﬀ barriers are rewarding to both trading partners. Secondly, embrac-
ing new technologies, such as the Internet and Information & Communication Technology
(ICT), to provide e-services to the citizen can enhance trade. These technologies help in
improving the quality of service by reducing human error and increasing convenience. Using
technology increases the eﬃciency of the system and also saves time and costs. At the same
time, adopting technology to provide service reduces the probability of direct interaction
between the traders and the customs oﬃcials, thereby reducing the incidence of bribery and
discriminatory treatments. Reduction in the incidence of bribery implies a lower degree of
corruption in the economy and, therefore, an increase in the volume of trade. However, the
results also suggested that for countries that are highly protected, corruption can be trade
enhancing. For those countries, along with the elimination of non-tariﬀ barriers, the most
eﬀective policy to stimulate trade is to reduce the level of tariﬀs. Otherwise, the attempts to
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reduce corruption might have an adverse eﬀect on trade. The limitations of this dissertation
are related to data availability. For example, the corruption indices used in this paper give
a perception about the general level of corruption in the economy. A better predictor of
the eﬀect of corruption on bilateral trade would have been cross-country data on bribery at
the border, which was unavailable. Similarly, cross-country data on one of the most impor-
tant determinants of Internet penetration, the cost of using the Internet, was unavailable.
Future research aims to test the eﬀect of these trade facilitation measures on the commodi-
ties at a more disaggregated level. This will help to further test for the diﬀerence in the
responsiveness of commodities due to diﬀerences in quality and degree of perishability.
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Appendix
E-governance
Table A.1 lists the value of E-government Readiness Index for each country during 2003
to 2005.
Table A.1: World E-government Readiness Index.
World Bank E-gov E-gov E-gov
Country/Territory Country Index Index Index
Code 2003 2004 2005
Afghanistan AFG 0.12 0.13 0.15
Albania ALB 0.31 0.34 0.37
Algeria DZA 0.37 0.32 0.32
Andorra AND 0.17 0.16 0.18
Angola AGO 0.19 0.20 0.18
Antigua and Barbuda ATG 0.36 0.37 0.40
Argentina ARG 0.58 0.59 0.60
Armenia ARM 0.38 0.39 0.36
Australia AUS 0.83 0.84 0.87
Austria AUT 0.68 0.75 0.76
Azerbaijan AZE 0.36 0.39 0.38
Bahamas BHS 0.43 0.46 0.47
Bahrain BHR 0.51 0.53 0.53
Bangladesh BGD 0.17 0.18 0.18
Barbados BRB 0.41 0.46 0.49
Belarus BLR 0.40 0.49 0.53
Belgium BEL 0.67 0.75 0.74
Belize BLZ 0.42 0.42 0.38
Benin BEN 0.24 0.22 0.23
Continued on next page
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Table A.1  continued
World Bank E-gov E-gov E-gov
Country/Territory Country Index Index Index
Code 2003 2004 2005
Bhutan BTN 0.16 0.16 0.29
Bolivia BOL 0.41 0.39 0.40
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH 0.31 0.38 0.40
Botswana BWA 0.35 0.38 0.40
Brazil BRA 0.53 0.57 0.60
Brunei Darussalam BRN 0.46 0.46 0.45
Bulgaria BGR 0.55 0.54 0.56
Burkina Faso BFA 0.14 0.18 0.13
Burundi BDI 0.18 0.16 0.16
Cambodia KHM 0.26 0.29 0.30
Cameroon CMR 0.27 0.26 0.25
Canada CAN 0.81 0.84 0.84
Cape Verde CPV 0.32 0.34 0.33
Chad TCD - 0.14 0.14
Chile CHL 0.67 0.68 0.70
China CHN 0.42 0.44 0.51
Colombia COL 0.44 0.53 0.52
Comoros COM 0.18 0.18 0.20
Congo COG 0.27 0.30 0.29
Costa Rica CRI 0.43 0.42 0.46
CÃ´te d'Ivoire CIV - 0.17 0.18
Croatia HRV 0.53 0.52 0.55
Cuba CUB 0.37 0.35 0.37
Cyprus CYP 0.47 0.52 0.59
Czech Republic CZE 0.54 0.62 0.64
Denmark DNK 0.82 0.90 0.91
Djibouti DJI 0.18 0.20 0.24
Dominica DMA - 0.37 0.33
Dominican Republic DOM 0.44 0.41 0.41
Ecuador ECU 0.38 0.39 0.40
Continued on next page
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Table A.1  continued
World Bank E-gov E-gov E-gov
Country/Territory Country Index Index Index
Code 2003 2004 2005
Egypt EGY 0.24 0.27 0.38
El Salvador SLV 0.41 0.40 0.42
Eritrea ERI - - 0.18
Estonia EST 0.70 0.70 0.73
Ethiopia ETH 0.13 0.14 0.14
Fiji FJI 0.43 0.39 0.41
Finland FIN 0.76 0.82 0.82
France FRA 0.69 0.67 0.69
Gabon GAB 0.28 0.30 0.29
Gambia GMB 0.17 0.17 0.17
Georgia GEO 0.35 0.38 0.40
Germany DEU 0.76 0.79 0.81
Ghana GHA 0.24 0.24 0.29
Greece GRC 0.54 0.56 0.59
Grenada GRD 0.35 0.36 0.39
Guatemala GTM 0.33 0.34 0.38
Guinea GIN 0.13 0.14 0.14
Guyana GUY 0.42 0.42 0.40
Honduras HND 0.28 0.33 0.33
Hungary HUN 0.52 0.59 0.65
Iceland ISL 0.70 0.77 0.78
India IND 0.37 0.39 0.40
Indonesia IDN 0.42 0.39 0.38
Iran IRN 0.33 0.33 0.38
Iraq IRQ - 0.36 0.33
Ireland IRL 0.70 0.71 0.73
Israel ISR 0.66 0.68 0.69
Italy ITA 0.69 0.66 0.68
Jamaica JAM 0.43 0.48 0.51
Japan JPN 0.69 0.73 0.78
Continued on next page
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Table A.1  continued
World Bank E-gov E-gov E-gov
Country/Territory Country Index Index Index
Code 2003 2004 2005
Jordan JOR 0.43 0.43 0.46
Kazakhstan KAZ 0.39 0.43 0.48
Kenya KEN 0.30 0.30 0.33
Kuwait KWT 0.37 0.36 0.44
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 0.33 0.45 0.44
Lao LAO 0.19 0.23 0.24
Latvia LVA 0.51 0.55 0.61
Lebanon LBN 0.42 0.42 0.46
Lesotho LSO 0.35 0.33 0.34
Liechtenstein LIE 0.18 0.19 0.18
Lithuania LTU 0.56 0.54 0.58
Luxembourg LUX 0.66 0.66 0.65
Macedonia MKD 0.36 0.37 0.46
Madagascar MDG 0.23 0.22 0.26
Malawi MWI 0.23 0.27 0.28
Malaysia MYS 0.52 0.54 0.57
Maldives MDV 0.41 0.41 0.43
Mali MLI 0.14 0.10 0.09
Malta MLT 0.64 0.69 0.70
Marshall Islands MHL 0.04 0.04 0.04
Mauritania MRT 0.16 0.17 0.17
Mauritius MUS 0.47 0.51 0.53
Mexico MEX 0.59 0.60 0.61
Micronesia FSM 0.53 0.05 0.05
Moldova MDA 0.36 0.34 0.35
Monaco MCO 0.19 0.20 0.24
Mongolia MNG 0.34 0.42 0.40
Morocco MAR 0.27 0.26 0.28
Mozambique MOZ 0.17 0.20 0.24
Myanmar MMR 0.28 0.30 0.30
Continued on next page
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Table A.1  continued
World Bank E-gov E-gov E-gov
Country/Territory Country Index Index Index
Code 2003 2004 2005
Namibia NAM 0.34 0.33 0.34
Nauru NRU 0.29 0.04 0.04
Nepal NPL 0.27 0.28 0.30
Netherlands NLD 0.75 0.80 0.80
New Zealand NZL 0.72 0.78 0.80
Nicaragua NIC 0.32 0.32 0.34
Niger NER 0.06 0.06 0.07
Nigeria NGA 0.23 0.25 0.28
Norway NOR 0.78 0.82 0.82
Oman OMN 0.36 0.29 0.34
Pakistan PAK 0.25 0.30 0.28
Palau PLW 0.01 0.04 0.06
Panama PAN 0.43 0.49 0.48
Papua New Guinea PNG 0.25 0.24 0.25
Paraguay PRY 0.41 0.34 0.36
Peru PER 0.46 0.50 0.51
Philippines PHL 0.57 0.53 0.57
Poland POL 0.58 0.60 0.59
Portugal PRT 0.65 0.60 0.61
Qatar QAT 0.41 0.40 0.49
Republic of Korea REU 0.74 0.86 0.87
Romania ROM 0.48 0.55 0.57
Russia RUS 0.44 0.50 0.53
Rwanda RWA 0.24 0.25 0.25
Saint Kitts and Nevis KNA 0.43 0.42 0.45
Saint Lucia LCA 0.44 0.46 0.45
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines VCT 0.36 0.32 0.40
Samoa WSM 0.30 0.38 0.40
San Marino SMR 0.28 0.29 0.31
Sao Tome and Principe STP 0.27 0.28 0.28
Continued on next page
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Table A.1  continued
World Bank E-gov E-gov E-gov
Country/Territory Country Index Index Index
Code 2003 2004 2005
Saudi Arabia SAU 0.34 0.39 0.41
Senegal SEN 0.20 0.23 0.22
Serbia and Montenegro SRB 0.37 0.39 0.20
Seychelles SYC 0.42 0.43 0.49
Sierra Leone SLE 0.13 0.17 0.16
Singapore SGP 0.75 0.83 0.85
Slovakia SVK 0.53 0.56 0.59
Slovenia SVN 0.63 0.65 0.68
Solomon Islands SLB 0.28 0.27 0.27
Somalia SOM 0.05 - -
South Africa ZAF 0.52 0.49 0.51
Spain ESP 0.60 0.58 0.58
Sri Lanka LKA 0.39 0.37 0.40
Sudan SDN 0.21 0.23 0.24
Suriname SUR 0.35 0.34
Swaziland SWZ 0.30 0.36 0.36
Sweden SWE 0.84 0.87 0.90
Switzerland CHE 0.76 0.75 0.75
Syrian Arab Republic SYR 0.26 0.26 0.29
Tajikistan TJK - - 0.33
Tanzania TZA 0.25 0.28 0.30
Thailand THA 0.45 0.55 0.55
Timor-Leste TMP 0.09 0.05 0.25
Togo TGO 0.23 0.23 0.23
Tonga TON 0.39 0.38 0.37
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 0.43 0.47 0.48
Tunisia TUN 0.33 0.32 0.33
Turkey TUR 0.51 0.49 0.50
Turkmenistan TKM 0.34 0.34
Tuvalu TUV - - 0.04
Continued on next page
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Table A.1  continued
World Bank E-gov E-gov E-gov
Country/Territory Country Index Index Index
Code 2003 2004 2005
Uganda UGA 0.30 0.33 0.31
Ukraine UKR 0.46 0.53 0.55
United Arab Emirates ARE 0.54 0.47 0.57
United Kingdom GBR 0.81 0.89 0.88
United States USA 0.93 0.91 0.91
Uruguay URY 0.51 0.55 0.54
Uzbekistan UZB - 0.40 0.41
Vanuatu VUT 0.14 0.16 0.17
Venezuela VEN 0.36 0.49 0.52
Viet Nam VNM 0.36 0.34 0.36
Yemen YEM 0.19 0.19 0.21
Zambia ZMB 0.28 - -
Zimbabwe ZWE 0.30 0.28 0.33
The E-government Readiness Index takes a value between 0 to 1
Higher values of the index implies better quality of e-governance
Table A.2 shows the result from the ﬁrst-step of Heckman's two-step method. Table A.3
presents the estimation from random eﬀect model.
Table A.2: E-governance & Agricultural Exports: Heckman's Two Step Model.
First-step Estimates; Identiﬁcation Variable: Common Language
Island Landlocked Common Common Constant
Economy Economy Border Colony
Coeﬃcient 0.243*** 0.036 1.003*** 1.242*** -1.319***
Standard Error 0.026 0.034 0.046 0.072 0.013
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.3: E-governance & Agricultural Exports: Random Eﬀect Model
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(E-governance)e 0.043 0.676** 1.659*** 1.788***
(0.028) (0.232) (0.464) (0.456)
log(E-governance)i -0.001 -0.014 -0.215 -0.161
(0.019) (0.025) (0.308) (0.307)
log(GDP)e 0.686*** 0.142 -0.047 0.101
(0.018) (0.087) (0.138) (0.161)
log(GDP)i 0.668*** 0.763*** 0.808*** 0.838***
(0.012) (0.030) (0.076) (0.078)
log(Distance)ei -2.605*** -2.735*** -2.566*** -2.527***
(0.079) (0.127) (0.164) (0.166)
Common Colony_ei 1.437*** 1.150*** 0.529 0.509
(0.220) (0.280) (0.421) (0.416)
Island Economy_e -0.053 -0.658*** -0.506** -0.530**
(0.076) (0.130) (0.183) (0.185)
Landlocked Economy_e -0.822*** -0.676*** -0.990*** -1.062***
(0.088) (0.143) (0.184) (0.185)
Common Language_ei 0.737*** 1.080*** 1.562*** 1.580***
(0.086) (0.135) (0.172) (0.173)
Common Border_ei 1.465*** 0.987*** 0.415 0.448
(0.162) (0.262) (0.388) (0.394)
log(Population)e 0.467*** 0.504** 0.34
(0.088) (0.153) (0.178)
log(Population)i -0.0924** -0.062 -0.0936
(0.033) (0.078) (0.080)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e 0.808** -0.368 -0.528
(0.261) (0.417) (0.423)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.018 -0.014 -0.009
(0.020) (0.030) (0.030)
log(Regulatory Quality)e 0.252** 0.197*
(0.082) (0.085)
log(Regulatory Quality)i 0.137*** 0.124***
(0.037) (0.037)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 21869 6437 2598 2598
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with e-governance as main ex-
planatory variable. It also includes region and income dummies are included. Column 2, controls
for the eﬀect of population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3, includes the qual-
ity of regulation in each country. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Constant
not reported.
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Corruption
5.0.1 Control of Corruption Index and Corruption Perception Index
In this paper Control of Corruption (CCI) index is used as a main explanatory variable. As
mentioned in World Governance Indicators (WGI) reports - Control of corruption captures
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as `capture' of the state by elites and private
interests. This corruption indicator is a composite index combining up to 22 diﬀerent as-
sessments and surveys from sources like the Country Policy and Institutional Assessments
of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank, the
Afrobarometer Survey, the World Bank's Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey etc. While constructing Control of Corruption Index (CCI), a diverse group of peo-
ple is surveyed, and their perception regarding corruption in the country is recorded. CCI
includes assessment of a country's performance provided by business people and also assess-
ments provided by a group of country/risk/expert analysts. Each of the surveys receives
a diﬀerent weight, depending on its estimated precision and country coverage. The larger
weights are given to sources that have similar ﬁndings.
Some of the questions asked by data sources (surveys and expert opinions) that form a
part of the CCI are as follows: Is corruption in government widespread?  How many elected
leaders (parliamentarians) do you think are involved in corruption?" How many judges and
magistrates do you think are involved in corruption? How many government oﬃcials do you
think are involved in corruption? How many border/tax oﬃcials do you think are involved
in corruption? How common is for ﬁrms to have to pay irregular additional payments
to get things done? How often do ﬁrms make extra payments in connection with taxes,
customs, and judiciary? How problematic is corruption for the growth of your business?
To what extent does corruption exist in a way that detracts from the business environment
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for foreign companies?
For sensitivity analysis, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is used as a proxy for
corruption. CPI is a composite index created using data from diﬀerent surveys conducted
by a number of reputed institutions like African Development Bank, World Bank, World
Economic Forum, Freedom House, The Economist Intelligence Unit, etc. CPI ranks diﬀerent
countries and territories based on how corrupt a country's public sector is perceived to be.
To ensure accuracy and robustness of the index, CPI ranks only those countries that are
covered by a minimum of three diﬀerent data sources. While compiling CPI, each data
sources has been normalized to the same mean and standard deviation i.e. all the data
sources are given equal weight while calculating CPI for each country. While conducting
the surveys, respondents were asked a few questions and were asked to assign a number in
a given range to each of their answers indicating the extent to which he or she agrees to the
statement or the question.
Some of the questions reﬂected in the 2010 CPI scores are following: To what extent
are there legal or political penalties for oﬃceholders who abuse their positions? To what
extent can the government successfully contain corruption?" Are there clear procedures and
accountability governing the allocation and use of public funds? Are public funds misappro-
priated by ministers/public oﬃcials for private or party political purposes; are there special
funds for which there is no accountability; are there general abuses of public resources?
Is there a professional civil service or are large numbers of oﬃcials directly appointed by
the government? Is there an independent body auditing the management of the public
ﬁnances? Is there an independent judiciary with the power to try ministers/public oﬃ-
cials for abuses? Is there a tradition of a payment of bribes to secure contracts and gain
favors? Is the country's economy free of excessive state involvement? Is the government
free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration requirements, and other controls
that increase opportunities for corruption? Are there signiﬁcant limitations on the par-
ticipation of government oﬃcials in economic life? Does the government advertise jobs
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and contracts? Do whistle-blowers, anti-corruption activists, investigators, and journalists
enjoy legal protections that make them feel secure about reporting cases of bribery and cor-
ruption? Are allegations of corruption given wide and extensive airing in the media? In
your country, how common is it for ﬁrms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes
connected with the following: a) Imports and exports? b) Public utilities (e.g. telephone
or electricity)? c) Annual tax payments? d) Awarding of public contracts and licenses? e)
Obtaining favorable judicial decisions?
The correlation coeﬃcient between CPI and CCI is almost closer to 0.97 for the sample
of countries used in this paper. This high correlation between these two indices is not
surprising because of the fact that there are several common data sources in the computation
of the two corruption indices. For example, data sources like African Development Bank,
Asian Development, Bertelsmann Foundation, Freedom House, Economist Intelligence Unit,
Global Insight, Political & Economic Risk Consultancy, World Economic Forum Global
Competitiveness Report, and World Bank are common for both the indices.
Table A.4 represents the value of CCI and CPI in 2010 for all the countries.
Table A.4: World Corruption Index, 2010.
World Bank Control of Corruption
Country/Territory Country Corruption Perception
Code Index Index
Afghanistan AFG -1.90 1.40
Albania ALB -0.44 3.30
Algeria DZA -0.75 2.90
American Samoa ASM 1.16 -
Andora ADO 1.23 -
Angola AGO -1.26 1.90
Anguilla AIA 1.42 -
Antigua and Barbuda ATG 0.99 -
Argentina ARG -0.62 2.90
Continued on next page
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Table A.4  continued
World Bank Control of Corruption
Country Country Corruption Perception
Code Index Index
Armenia ARM -0.47 2.60
Aruba ABW 1.42 -
Australia AUS 1.76 8.70
Austria AUT 1.81 7.90
Azerbaijan AZE -0.85 2.40
Bahamas BHS 0.69 -
Bahrain BHR 0.48 4.90
Bangladesh BGD -0.79 2.40
Barbados BRB 1.04 7.80
Belarus BLR -1.04 2.50
Belgium BEL 1.37 7.10
Belize BLZ -0.36 -
Benin BEN -0.70 2.80
Bermuda BMU 1.16 -
Bhutan BTN 0.12 5.70
Bolivia BOL -1.05 2.80
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH -0.37 3.20
Botswana BWA 0.67 5.80
Brazil BRA 0.00 3.70
Brunei BRN 0.79 5.50
Bulgaria BGR -0.10 3.60
Burkina Faso BFA -0.18 3.10
Burundi BDI -1.19 1.80
Cambodia KHM -1.09 2.10
Cameroon CMR -1.05 2.20
Canada CAN 1.81 8.90
Cape Verde CPV 0.42 5.10
Cayman Islands CYM 0.89 -
Central African Republic CAF -1.29 2.10
Chad TCD -1.48 1.70
Continued on next page
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Table A.4  continued
World Bank Control of Corruption
Country Country Corruption Perception
Code Index Index
Chile CHL 1.32 7.20
China CHN -0.33 3.50
Colombia COL -0.35 3.50
Comoros COM -1.06 2.10
Cook Islands COK -0.89 -
Costa Rica CRI 0.49 5.30
Cote d'Ivoire CIV -1.24 2.20
Croatia HRV 0.17 4.10
Cuba CUB -0.66 3.70
Cyprus CYP 1.20 6.30
Czech Republic CZE 0.93 4.60
Denmark DNK 1.90 9.30
Democratic Republic of Congo ZAR -1.61 2.00
Djibouti DJI -0.71 3.20
Dominica DMA 0.69 5.20
Dominican Republic DOM -0.80 3.00
Ecuador ECU -1.21 2.50
Egypt EGY -0.12 3.10
El Salvador SLV -0.87 3.60
Equatorial Guinea GNQ -1.27 1.90
Eritrea ERI -1.29 2.60
Estonia EST 1.13 6.50
Ethiopia ETH -0.75 2.70
Fiji FJI -0.85 -
Finland FIN 1.98 9.20
France FRA 1.51 6.80
French Guina GUF 1.17 -
Gabon GAB -0.51 2.80
Gambia GMB -0.51 3.20
Georgia GEO -0.21 3.80
Continued on next page
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Table A.4  continued
World Bank Control of Corruption
Country Country Corruption Perception
Code Index Index
Germany DEU 1.62 7.90
Ghana GHA -0.06 4.10
Greece GRC 0.61 3.50
Greenland GRL 1.72
Grenada GRD 0.11
Guam GUM 1.16 -
Guatemala GTM -1.00 3.20
Guinea GIN -1.50 2.00
Guinea-Bissau GNB -1.35 2.10
Guyana GUY -0.48 2.70
Haiti HTI -1.39 2.20
Honduras HND -0.89 2.40
Hong Kong HKG 1.54 -
Hungary HUN 0.75 4.70
Iceland ISL 1.70 8.50
India IND -0.04 3.30
Indonesia IDN -0.64 2.80
Iran IRN -0.98 2.20
Iraq IRQ -1.62 1.50
Ireland IRL 1.77 8.00
Israel ISR 0.90 6.10
Italy ITA 0.38 3.90
Jamaica JAM -0.50 3.30
Japan JPN 1.33 7.80
Jordan JOR 0.20 4.70
Kazakhstan KAZ -0.61 2.90
Kenya KEN -0.99 2.10
Kiribati KIR 0.07 3.20
North Korea PRK -1.30 -
South Korea KOR 0.99 -
Continued on next page
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Table A.4  continued
World Bank Control of Corruption
Country Country Corruption Perception
Code Index Index
Kosovo KSV -0.64 -
Kuwait KWT 0.60 4.50
Kyrgyzstan KGZ -1.28 2.00
Laos LAO -0.92 2.10
Latvia LVA 0.78 4.30
Lebanon LBN -0.69 2.50
Lesotho LSO -0.30 3.50
Liberia LBR -1.01 3.30
Libya LBY -0.94 2.20
Liechtenstein LIE 1.62 -
Lithuania LTU 0.75 5.00
Luxembourg LUX 1.83 8.50
Macao MAC 0.70 -
Macedonia MKD -0.29 4.10
Madagascar MDG -0.85 2.60
Malawi MWI -0.14 3.40
Malaysia MYS 0.53 4.40
Maldives MDV -0.33 2.30
Mali MLI -0.44 2.70
Malta MLT 1.44 5.60
Marshall Island MHL -0.27 -
Martiniue MTQ 0.89 -
Mauritania MRT -0.87 2.30
Mauritius MUS 0.86 5.40
Mexico MEX -0.58 3.10
Micronesia FSM -0.09 -
Moldova MDA -0.39 2.90
Monaco MCO 0.90 -
Mongolia MNG -0.39 2.70
Montenegro MNE 0.00 3.70
Continued on next page
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Table A.4  continued
World Bank Control of Corruption
Country Country Corruption Perception
Code Index Index
Morocco MAR -0.16 3.40
Mozambique MOZ -0.47 2.70
Myanmar MMR -1.51 1.40
Namibia NAM 0.19 4.40
Nauru NRU 0.42
Nepal NPL -1.01 2.20
Netherlands NLD 1.81 8.80
Netherlands Antilles ANT 0.89 -
New Zealand NZL 1.87 9.30
Nicaragua NIC -0.84 2.50
Niger NER -0.52 2.60
Nigeria NGA -1.17 2.40
Niue NIU -0.72 -
Norway NOR 1.92 8.60
Oman OMN 0.64 5.30
Pakistan PAK -0.74 2.30
Palau PLW 0.74 -
Panama PAN -0.10 3.60
Papua New Guinea PNG -0.95 2.10
Paraguay PRY -0.91 2.20
Peru PER -0.60 3.50
Philippines PHL -0.58 2.40
Poland POL 0.66 5.30
Portugal PRT 1.04 6.00
Puerto Rico PRI 0.77 5.80
Qatar QAT 0.95 7.70
Reunion REU 0.89
Republic of Congo COG -1.18 -
Romania ROM 0.04 3.70
Russia RUS -0.77 2.10
Continued on next page
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World Bank Control of Corruption
Country Country Corruption Perception
Code Index Index
Rwanda RWA -0.30 4.00
Samoa WSM 0.65 4.10
San Marino SMR 0.90 -
Sao Tome and Principe STP -0.72 3.00
Saudi Arabia SAU 0.26 4.70
Senegal SEN -0.40 2.90
Serbia SRB -0.40 3.50
Seychelles SYC 0.02 4.80
Sierra Leone SLE -0.96 2.40
Singapore SGP 1.68 9.30
Slovakia SVK 0.53 4.30
Slovenia SVN 0.98 6.40
Solomon Islands SLB -0.70 2.80
Somalia SOM -2.45 1.10
South Africa ZAF 0.11 5.40
South Korea SSD -4.50 -
Spain ESP 1.16 6.10
Sri Lanka LKA -0.08 3.20
Saint Kitts and Nevis KNA 0.71
Saint Lucia LCA 0.82 -
Sudan SDN -1.30 1.60
Suriname SUR -0.10 -
Swaziland SWZ -0.49 3.20
Sweden SWE 1.96 9.20
Switzerland CHE 1.77 8.70
Syria SYR -0.50 2.50
Taiwan TWN 1.02 5.80
Tajikistan TJK -1.18 2.10
Tanzania TZA -0.49 2.70
Thailand THA -0.20 3.50
Continued on next page
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World Bank Control of Corruption
Country Country Corruption Perception
Code Index Index
Timor-Leste TMP -1.22 2.50
Togo TGO -0.91 2.40
Tonga TON 0.08 3.00
Trinidad & Tobago TTO -0.22 3.60
Tunisia TUN 0.12 4.30
Turkey TUR 0.12 4.40
Turkmenistan TKM -1.45 1.60
Tuvulu TUV 1.02 -
Uganda UGA -0.39 2.50
Ukraine UKR -0.81 2.40
United Arab Emirates ARE 0.37 6.30
United Kingdom GBR 1.76 7.60
USA USA 1.63 7.10
Uruguay URY 0.70 6.90
Uzbekistan UZB -1.37 1.60
Vanuatu VUT 0.24 3.60
Venezuela VEN -1.64 2.00
Vietnam VNM -0.53 2.70
US Virgin Islands VIR 0.89 -
West Bank and Gaza WBG -0.21 -
Yemen YEM -1.07 2.20
Zambia ZMB -0.50 3.00
Zimbabwe ZWE -1.81 2.40
The CCI takes values in the range of −2.5 to 2.5, and CPI takes values in the range of 0 to 10.
Higher values of both the indices imply lower corruption. The CCI covers more countries than
CPI and hence missing values for the CPI.
112
Figure A.1 shows the level of corruption around the world in 2009 as measured by CPI.
Figure A.1: Corruption Perception Index, 2009
Table A.5 presents the result from the ﬁrst-step of Heckman's two-step model. Table A.6
and A.7 presents the results from random eﬀect model using CCI and CPI respectively.
Table A.5: Corruption & Agricultural Exports: Heckman's Two Step Model.
First-step Estimates; Identiﬁcation Variable: Common Language
Island Landlocked Common Common Constant
Economy Economy Border Colony
Coeﬃcient 0.228*** 0.0002 1.032*** 1.279*** -1.331***
Standard Error 0.019 0.025 0.035 0.055 -0.009
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Corruption (CCI) & Agricultural Exports: Random Eﬀect Model
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCCI_e 0.540*** 0.352*** 0.376*** 0.436***
(0.039) (0.059) (0.071) (0.075)
CorruptionCCI_i 0.058 0.009 -0.058 -0.0271
(0.030) (0.048) (0.056) (0.057)
log(GDP)e 0.577*** 0.591*** 0.589*** 0.445***
(0.036) (0.073) (0.072) (0.086)
log(GDP)i 0.700*** 0.715*** 0.716*** 0.683***
(0.020) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
log(Distance)ei -2.860*** -2.880*** -2.870*** -2.878***
(0.079) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Island Economy_e -0.169* -0.418*** -0.419*** -0.406***
(0.075) (0.105) (0.104) (0.104)
Landlocked Economy_e -0.973*** -0.838*** -0.838*** -0.802***
(0.086) (0.135) (0.134) (0.135)
Common Language_ei 0.759*** 0.919*** 0.920*** 0.915***
(0.085) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
Common Border_ei 1.443*** 1.152*** 1.147*** 1.125***
(0.159) (0.272) (0.273) (0.271)
Common Colony_ei 1.455*** 0.485 0.482 0.518
(0.202) (0.447) (0.450) (0.441)
log(Population)e 0.242*** 0.058 0.059 0.206*
(0.042) (0.081) (0.081) (0.095)
log(Population)i -0.004 -0.032 -0.031 -0.002
(0.024) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.132*** -0.128*** -0.129***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.026)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -0.289 -0.286 -0.233
(0.212) (0.212) (0.214)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_e -0.012 -0.011
(0.018) (0.018)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCCI_i 0.041* 0.041*
(0.018) (0.019)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 41171 14373 14373 14373
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with CCI as the main explana-
tory variable. It also includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of
population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interaction terms be-
tween tariﬀ structure and the level of corruption. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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Table A.7: Corruption (CPI) & Agricultural Exports: Random Eﬀect Model
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (1) (2) (3) (4)
CorruptionCPI_e 0.071*** 0.062** 0.059 0.069*
(0.016) (0.024) (0.032) (0.033)
CorruptionCPI_i 0.0280** 0.0121 -0.0305 -0.0234
(0.011) (90.017) (0.024) (0.024)
log(GDP)e 0.612*** 0.600*** 0.590*** 0.499***
(0.038) (0.075) (0.075) (0.090)
log(GDP)i 0.701*** 0.709*** 0.714*** 0.693***
(0.019) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
log(Distance)ei -2.765*** -2.791*** -2.775*** -2.775***
(0.084) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123)
Island Economy_e -0.205** -0.469*** -0.468*** -0.462***
(0.077) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108)
Landlocked Economy_e -0.904*** -0.813*** -0.816*** -0.798***
(0.092) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142)
Common Language_ei 0.728*** 0.914*** 0.919*** 0.915***
(0.089) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118)
Common Border_ei 1.512*** 1.170*** 1.173*** 1.161***
(0.167) (0.283) (0.283) (0.282)
Common Colony_ei 1.457*** 0.575 0.569 0.596
(0.207) (0.480) (0.480) (0.476)
log(Population)e 0.152*** 0.028 0.037 0.127
(0.044) (0.083) (0.083) (0.097)
log(Population)i -0.018 -0.048 -0.052 -0.036
(0.023) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.132*** -0.239*** -0.241***
(0.021) (0.069) (0.069)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -0.290 -0.287 -0.270
(0.223) (0.223) (0.225)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_e 0.002 0.002
(0.008) (0.008)
log(Tariﬀ)ie × CorruptionCPI_i 0.022* 0.022*
(0.009) (0.009)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No No No Yes
Observations 37892 13469 13469 13469
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The ﬁrst column includes standard gravity model variables along with CPI as the main explana-
tory variable. It also includes region and income dummies. Column 2, controls for the eﬀect of
population, real exchange rate, and tariﬀ structure. Column 3 includes the interaction terms be-
tween tariﬀ structure and the level of corruption. The last column controls for time speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects. Constant not reported.
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Internet
Figure A.2 shows the degree of internet adoption in the world in 2013.
Figure A.2: Internet Users, 2013
Table A.8 shows the result from the ﬁrst-step of Heckman's two-step model. Table A.9
presents the results from random eﬀect model.
Table A.8: The Internet & Bilateral Exports: Heckman's Two Step Model.
First-step Estimates; Identiﬁcation Variable: Common Language
Island Landlocked Common Common Constant
Economy Economy Border Colony
Coeﬃcient 0.231*** 0.091 1.016*** 1.250*** -1.332***
Standard Error 0.018 0.022 0.035 0.056 -0.009
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.9: The Internet & Bilateral Exports: Random Eﬀect Model
Dependent variable: log(Export)ei (A1) (A2) (N1) (N2)
log(Internet)e 0.209*** 0.195** 0.120* 0.260***
(0.061) (0.067) (0.052) (0.056)
log(Internet)i 0.019 0.009 -0.065* 0.045
(0.033) (0.036) (0.026) (0.029)
log(GDP)e 0.650*** 0.654*** 1.562*** 1.555***
(0.054) (0.058) (0.042) (0.044)
log(GDP)i 0.642*** 0.646*** 0.758*** 0.726***
(0.037)) (0.038) (0.028) (0.029)
log(Distance)ei -2.846*** -2.848*** -2.992*** -3.010***
(0.123) (0.123) (0.104) (0.105)
Common Colony_ei 0.62 0.626 0.523 0.431
(0.481) (0.481) (0.292) (0.290)
Island Economy_e -0.374*** -0.372*** -1.104*** -1.133***
(0.112) (0.112) (0.079) (0.079)
Landlocked Economy_e -0.781*** -0.780*** 0.350*** 0.348***
(0.126) (0.129) (0.083) (0.087)
Common Language_ei 0.931*** 0.930*** 1.232*** 1.255***
(0.119) (0.119) (0.098) (0.099)
Common Border_ei 1.121*** 1.117*** 1.412*** 1.440***
(0.281) (0.281) (0.245) (0.248)
log(Population)e -0.069 -0.070 -0.314*** -0.298***
(0.060) (0.063) (0.044) (0.046)
log(Population)i 0.013 0.009 0.068* 0.113***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.028) (0.029)
log(Real Exchange Rate)e -0.463* -0.487* -1.405*** -1.251***
(0.191) (0.193) (0.155) (0.157)
log(Tariﬀ)ie -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.054*** -0.052***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015)
log(Export Cost)ei 0.065 0.061 -0.668*** -0.595***
0.092) (0.106) (0.068) (0.075)
log(Import Cost)ie -0.364*** -0.378*** -0.374*** -0.290***
(0.049) (0.052) (0.043) (0.043)
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀect No Yes No Yes
Observations 13628 13628 21155 21155
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Column 1 & 2 presents the results for agricultural commodities. Column 3 & 4 provides the results
for non-agricultural products. Each column includes standard gravity model variables along with
internet penetration as main explanatory variable. Constant not reported.
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